On 12 February, Bangladesh held parliamentary elections with a voter turnout of around 60%, which saw the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), out of power since 2006, win a sweeping majority of seats. However, this high participation level alone does not explain why these elections have particular political significance. Just 18 months earlier, in August 2024, a student-led uprising ended the regime of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina after more than a decade of her increasingly authoritarian rule. For many citizens, especially younger ones, these elections were about more than a routine transfer of office. They were widely seen as a test of whether the momentum of their revolution can lead to lasting institutional change.
A central question throughout the electoral campaign was whether the new political arrangements put in place by the interim government will be capable of constraining executive authority, even if power were to be consolidated once more around the BNP leadership. There were concerns that, in the absence of strong institutional safeguards, the country’s next leadership could reproduce patterns of governance that many protesters had sought to change. In addition to the elections, voters took part in a referendum. They were asked to approve or reject a package of 81 constitutional reforms, summarised in the July Charter, which proposes curbing executive power and creating an upper house of parliament. Most voters had barely heard of the referendum until late in the campaign, yet the interim government under Chief Advisor Mohammad Yunus pushed for a “yes” vote to conclude the transitional period, blurring the line between administration and advocacy.
The political landscape has changed dramatically. Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League – which had remained in office through three consecutive elections amid serious allegations of electoral manipulation, restricted political competition and grave human rights violations – was suspended and could not run.
The electoral race was dominated on one side by the BNP, the Awami League’s historical opponent, led by Tarique Rahman, who had returned from long-term exile. On the other, challenging the former establishment, stood the ten-party alliance led by Jamaat-e-Islami, which had been banned for 15 years, with the reform-oriented National Citizen Party (NCP), formed by student activists after the uprising, and a number of Islamist parties. The NCP’s decision to partner with Jamaat-e-Islami led several of its prominent women leaders to resign in protest.
On both sides, policy platforms were limited in scope and campaign messaging focused largely on organisational strength and political networks. For many voters, the choice was therefore shaped less by competing reform programmes than by established or newly emerging patron-client relations.
What went wrong during the campaign
Several problems shaped the lead-up to the elections, which put the results in context. The selection of candidates was controlled by small circles at the top of parties, with decisions made through patronage and behind-the-curtain deals, without transparent criteria. Campaign financing was a major issue. Although there are disclosure rules and spending limits, their enforcement was limited, and campaign costs were high. Therefore, candidates without personal resources or strong political backing faced clear disadvantages.
The Bangladesh Election Commission operated under sustained pressure. Managing the referendum alongside the parliamentary elections placed additional strain on administrative capacity and contributed to voter confusion. The interim government’s advocacy in support of a “yes” vote, alongside accusations of political bias, raised questions regarding its impartiality. International election observers, most notably from the European Union, closely monitored the process.
In continuation of ongoing law-and-order concerns under the interim government, the security conditions weakened as the campaign intensified. Bangladesh is notorious for electoral violence. Clashes between rival groups were reported in several areas, and the police and the security forces provided protection unevenly. In some cases, candidates’ access to effective protection appeared linked to their political affiliation. In addition, sustained online disinformation campaigns sought to destabilise the electoral process.
The participation of women remained extremely limited. Only about 85 of the 1,981 candidates were women, and many parties fielded no female candidates at all. Based on the preliminary results, only seven women won a seat. Reserved seats allocated through party lists continued to limit the independence of women from party leadership. Monitoring and interviews indicate that women candidates faced high costs, restrictive nominations, and limited financial support. What is more, women candidates were disproportionately exposed to online violence, hate speech, and intimidation on social media.
What comes next
The impact of the elections will depend on what happens next. It remains to be seen if winning candidates will engage in any violence against national minorities and other disadvantaged groups as commonly happened in the past. Looking further ahead, democratic outcomes will be shaped by how the new government exercises power, respects legal limits, and responds to oversight – and how it implements the July Charter following the “yes” vote in the referendum. Effective dispute-resolution mechanisms and consistent rule enforcement will be central to this process.
Internal party governance remains a priority area for reforms. Clearer rules, documented procedures, and independent review mechanisms are needed to strengthen internal accountability. Campaign-finance regulation requires stronger enforcement. Key priorities include detailed financial reporting, routine audits, timely public disclosure, and effective sanctions for violations.
Inclusion measures need to move beyond symbolic commitments. Reserved seats provide a baseline, but greater emphasis should be placed on competitive nominations, direct elections, and incentives for parties to field underrepresented candidates in winnable constituencies.
Independent institutions, including courts, anti-corruption bodies, and election administration, require stronger legal protection and operational safeguards. Officials must be able to act without political interference. Security arrangements during elections should be predictable and impartial, supported by credible investigation and prosecution.
International engagement is most effective when it extends beyond short-term election observation. Sustained support for citizen monitoring, investigative journalism, legal and human rights advocacy, and independent data collection can strengthen accountability over time.
These elections marked a transitional moment rather than a conclusion, and key political outcomes of this process remain to be seen. Bangladesh’s future democratic resilience will depend on whether institutional constraints will be respected and whether oversight bodies retain the independence and protection necessary to hold governing actors accountable.
Author
Nafisa Raihana is a mathematician and works at the Technical University of Munich Graduate School. She is an activist and advocates for women’s rights. She is a member of the Forum for Women’s Political Rights (FWPR), working to advance women’s political rights. She is also working as a volunteer at the European Network for Women in Leadership. She is actively participating in political advocacy and currently working as a Research Fellow on an EPD project, where she is responsible for systematic analysis of social media data using Natural Language Processing. Her core interests include Computational Social Science and Mathematical Modeling.
This Commentary was produced in the context of the AHEAD Bangladesh project implemented by the European Partnership for Democracy. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
