Bernardo Arévalo’s unexpected victory in Guatemala’s 2023 presidential election offered an opportunity to restore democracy. Between his win in August and his inauguration in January 2024, the ruling regime attempted a judicial coup, but mass protests and international pressure, including timely sanctions and diplomatic engagement, thwarted it. Election observation mission’s report also served as a powerful tool to counter efforts to overturn the results. While Guatemala’s democratic future remains uncertain, this case underscores the impact of international support in defending democracy.

Bernardo Arévalo’s unexpected victory in Guatemala’s 2023 presidential election created a unique opportunity for democracy in a country on the verge of becoming an autocracy. Between Arévalo’s significant win in August and his inauguration in January 2024, there were several attempts by the ruling regime to overturn the election result and intimidate members of the president-elect’s Semilla Movement into exile. This judicial coup d’état, orchestrated by the attorney general’s office, ultimately failed, mainly because of massive demonstrations by Indigenous peoples and citizens who rallied to defend their democratic rights.

Marielos Chang

However, these protests would not have been sufficient without the crucial support of the international community, particularly the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). The EU played a vital role in ensuring a peaceful transition through timely sanctions, diplomatic engagement, and initiatives to promote democracy. In its effective response to Guatemala’s 2023 election, the EU shifted from a traditionally reactive foreign policy to a proactive approach that supported the country’s fragile democracy.

Guatemala’s moment of significant democratic opportunity

Former Guatemalan President Alejandro Giammattei and his criminal coalition had established a regime of fear.*1 Over a three-year period starting in 2020, at least 70 individuals – including judicial officials, journalists, and activists – were forced into exile, while a dozen others were unjustly detained. For Giammattei, Guatemala’s 2023 election was intended to eliminate any opponent who could threaten his rule of impunity. Ironically, winning the election was the final part of the president’s effort to entirely dismantle democracy in the country.*2

It was clear that Giammattei’s coalition was likely to emerge victorious, especially after the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), the office of Attorney General María Consuelo Porras, and the courts had fabricated electoral violations to disqualify anti-system candidates from across the political spectrum who had any chance of winning. A New York Times article detailed how the TSE magistrate, Blanca Alfaro, had visited the US embassy in Guatemala with a briefcase full of money from one of the president’s closest allies as part of a bribe to favour the candidate of Giammattei’s Vamos party.

Despite the ruling coalition’s numerous advantages after winning the 2019 election, Giammattei’s failure to address the country’s pressing needs – such as hospitals lacking supplies, crumbling schools, and unfinished roads – and the population’s weariness with blatant electoral manipulation ultimately led to its defeat in 2023. People ended up voting instead for the only anti-establishment presidential candidate left in the race. Observers at home and abroad were shocked when Arévalo, a little-known democrat, congressional deputy, and former diplomat, finished second out of 22 candidates in the first round of the election.

In response, the ruling regime and its allies mobilised the usual judicial traps. The constitutional court, on questionable grounds, ordered an election audit, which ultimately found no evidence of fraud. But this did not stop the regime; a corrupt criminal court judge and the attorney general’s office called for the Semilla Movement’s disqualification and sought to criminalise the party organisers and election officials who had certified the first-round result. Despite this legal assault, the second-round run-off proceeded as planned. On 20 August, Arévalo won by a landslide, with 58% of the vote, against Sandra Torres, who secured only 37%.

Arévalo’s win felt like a triumph for Guatemala’s citizens over a system that had sought to steal the election. The attorney general’s attacks against Arévalo underscored the significance of this extraordinary election and the need for Guatemalans to defend the future of democracy at the polls.

And the citizens responded. In the months that followed, each successive assault on the election result was met with an ever-stronger public response and outstanding support from the international community for the Guatemalan people.

In a historic event, Indigenous groups and the 48 Cantones, an Indigenous community government, led a national demonstration that lasted 12 days and called for Consuelo Porras’s resignation. In December 2023, the US announced the withdrawal of visas for nearly 300 individuals, including lawmakers and business leaders, for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Guatemala. Meanwhile, the EU called for expedited sanctions against officials who had attempted to orchestrate a coup against the elected leaders.

The coup attempt ultimately failed because the former regime’s allies abandoned it when they realised they lacked public support, a compelling narrative, media backing, and international allies. Any effort to disrupt the constitutional order would not go unpunished this time. Finally, on 14 January 2024, Arévalo and Vice President Karin Herrera were sworn in, marking the beginning of a unique opportunity for Guatemala to restore its democracy.

The EU’s response

Guatemala’s democratic forces received support from the EU in three specific ways. First, the union deployed an election observation mission (EOM), which later confirmed the integrity of the election result. The mission also quickly condemned judicial and prosecutorial efforts to undermine the electoral process and jeopardise the second-round run-off.

Second, the diplomatic capacity shown by the EU delegation in Guatemala was extraordinary. The delegation activated various resources to ensure that pro-democracy forces felt they had international support and were not alone in their struggle.

Third, the imposition of sanctions marked a significant shift in the EU’s foreign policy approach. Instead of its usual reactive stance, the EU adopted a proactive diplomatic policy by calling for immediate measures against anti-democratic actors. This approach was a game changer and helped turn the situation in Guatemala into a success story, showcasing how the international community can effectively defend democracy.

A strong election observation mission

Since 2000, the EU has deployed over 180 EOMs in more than 65 countries as part of its commitment to support democracy and human rights worldwide. An EOM is a technical assistance programme that provides the host country with a comprehensive, independent, and impartial evaluation of its election according to international and regional standards. This evaluation typically includes recommendations to enhance the integrity and effectiveness of future elections and broader democratisation efforts. Importantly, EOMs can be established only with the authorisation and invitation of the host country.

Although this was the third time an EOM had accompanied an election in Guatemala, the previous times being in 2003 and 2007, securing the government’s acceptance of the mission was a significant victory. When attacks on the country’s 2023 election began, the EOM report served as a powerful tool to counter unfounded narratives about potential fraud by the Semilla Movement and ensure that the second-round run-off took place. The observers did not let up when the authorities ordered vote audits and criminal investigations into Semilla and election officials.

In early August 2023, the mission monitored the extraction by the attorney general’s office of digital voting records to investigate the first-round result. The evidence gathered by the mission not only empowered the EU delegation to act with greater confidence in the following weeks; it also reassured allied countries like Norway that the election result was legitimate, enabling them to express their support for the process and the elected winner. “The first thing we did was to corroborate the transparency of the process. We knew that the European Union EOM had already made a statement, which gave us the confidence to issue our own,” said Ragnhild Imerslund, the Norwegian ambassador to Mexico and Central America.*3

EU Ambassador to Guatemala Thomas Peyker highlighted that one of the EOM’s advantages was its multi-party composition.*4 This feature allowed the mission’s statements to resonate with the European Parliament, which later proved crucial in gathering sufficient support for sanctions against anti-democratic actors.

Vibrant diplomacy

By 2023, the EU delegation in Guatemala was aware of the illegal tactics employed by Giammattei and the attorney general’s office over the previous three years. Peyker and his team of advisers had arrived in the country in the first year of Giammattei’s administration, and they were familiar with the methods used by the ruling coalition to criminalise the opposition and undermine efforts to combat corruption. The delegation had previously supported prosecutors and human rights defenders who were now in exile. So they recognised that Arévalo’s victory was a rare opportunity and understood the need to act quickly to ensure that the election result was upheld.

The delegation and the EU’s then former foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, first took action by supporting the election result with strong statements. They made clear that any attempt to undermine democracy would have consequences for economic and political relations between Guatemala and the EU. These initial statements were crucial because they flagged to anti-democratic forces which side the EU was on and made it known that sanctions would be applied if necessary.

During the long months of transition, the EU’s delegation and the EOM enforced a variety of diplomatic tools. These included public support for the winning candidates, visits by members of the European Parliament, and so-called silent diplomacy with business leaders and Indigenous organisations to help reduce tensions.*5 In an interview, Peyker remarked on the importance of silent diplomacy in persuading actors who were uncertain of what was at stake.*6

Game-changing sanctions

On 12 December 2023, the European Parliament called for expedited sanctions against those involved in the coup attempt, which resulted in the adoption in January 2024 of a framework for restrictive measures. One month later, the EU imposed sanctions on five officials, including Consuelo Porras.

The implementation of these sanctions marked a significant turning point for two reasons. First, this was the first time that the EU had imposed targeted sanctions on Guatemalan officials. Even when former President Jimmy Morales expelled the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, there was no discussion of sanctions. Second, the EU applied these measures preventively, rather than reactively, for the first time. Following the example set by the US, the union used sanctions as a tool of persuasion to avert a democratic breakdown, instead of waiting for such a breakdown to occur before imposing punitive measures.

Although the sanctions were implemented quickly – within less than six months – they were not rushed. From August to December 2023, a series of actions by the ruling coalition targeting the Semilla Movement and its members highlighted a systematic effort to prevent them from being sworn in. The turning point came on 8 December during a press conference held by the attorney general’s office, which provided the final arguments for the EU to apply its sanctions. At the press conference, the attorney general’s office declared that the election won by Arévalo was invalid, clearly demonstrating the intention of the attorney general and her officials to undermine the election result.

Recalling this press conference in an interview, Peyker said, “Usually, people who want to disrupt the democratic order do not publicly declare their intentions, but in this press conference, they were openly stating that they intended to carry out a coup d’état – live on television!”*7 The statements by the attorney general’s office, along with a speech by Borrell in the European Parliament, initiated the sanctions procedure, which later received the unanimous approval of the European Council.

Reactions of the US and European countries

Undeniably, the US set the pace for the international community’s response to the crisis in Guatemala. Its actions were swift and decisive, and successfully isolated the most radical members of the defeated coalition through various sanctions. Consuelo Porras and her associates did not have much left to lose, but her financial backers and some groups of the economic elite did.

In October 2023, the US imposed its first round of sanctions on officials from Giammattei’s government. However, by December, the US made clear that it would not wait to see how the situation would unfold. Those sanctioned included Miguel Martinez, the president’s closest ally, who was targeted through the Global Magnitsky sanctions programme, and an additional 300 individuals who were sanctioned by having their visas revoked. This proactive stance by the US strengthened confidence among allied countries.

The responses of the US and the EU were not significantly different: both used similar tools, including visits by senior officials, public and private diplomacy, and sanctions. However, the key difference lay in the speed and scale of their actions. The US made more announcements, conducted more visits by senior officials, and imposed more sanctions.

Nonetheless, one should not overlook the impact of the EU’s punitive measures. As international human rights lawyer Christian Gonzalez pointed out, “We are not talking about just one country [the US]; we are talking about 27 countries where those sanctioned will not be able to set foot.”*8 Sanctions included the freezing of assets and measures to bar businesses and individuals from conducting transactions with those targeted.

In the end, the international community’s collaboration made its pressure on Guatemala effective. When Brussels was slow to respond, countries like Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom took quicker action. This coordinated effort also enabled the establishment of a fund to provide technical support for Arévalo’s and Herrera’s transition teams.

Why EU support was successful

A significant factor in the success of international support was the presence of a clear timeline and objective: to ensure that Arévalo and Herrera were sworn in on 14 January 2024. This deadline focused all efforts and helped to avoid the fatigue that often accompanies long-term processes. However, this does not imply that slower, more prolonged support is ineffective. In fact, because the EU and European countries had invested years in programmes to strengthen civil society, individuals in Guatemala were ready to respond when the opportunity arose. The international community was also familiar with which actors to support and how. Patience can yield its own rewards.

International media coverage also played a significant role. Ongoing reports about events in Guatemala boosted lawmakers’ confidence in imposing sanctions. By helping to stop the coup attempt, the international community positioned itself on the right side of history. Besides, in Guatemala’s case, the political cost for the EU of these decisions was relatively low, as they did not involve a neighbouring country or a nation where the ruling regime had major economic ties with EU member states.

What lies ahead

After the 2024 inauguration, the EU launched several democracy-support initiatives. These included a memorandum of understanding to strengthen EU-Guatemala relations and the investment of €50 million for the department of Petén through the EU’s Global Gateway infrastructure programme. The EU announced new programmes aimed at promoting human rights and strengthening civil society organisations in Guatemala. Finally, the EU Council announced in December 2024 that its sanctions on anti-democratic actors would be renewed for another year.

It remains uncertain whether Arévalo’s new government will result in a democratic turnaround and end the country’s autocratic dynamic. This will depend largely on Arévalo’s ability to show that democracy can address pressing issues for the population, such as the high cost of living, while neutralising the continuous attacks from the attorney general. What is clear is that the EU has only a narrow opportunity to help ensure the new government does not waste this opportunity. So far, the president has not succeeded in this task, and the international community cannot intervene unless Arévalo directly confronts the issues at stake.

With US President Donald Trump back in power, the EU will need to evaluate whether it can effectively advocate for democracy in the region without substantial support from the US. The experiences of the first Trump administration serve as a reminder of the potential challenges. Will the EU rise to the occasion?

 

Author

Marielos Chang is an international consultant with over ten years of experience advising private and government institutions on political and communication issues. She holds a degree in Political Science and a master’s in Communication and Development from the University of Westminster in London. She is part of Georgetown University’s Global Competitiveness Leadership program, an Open Government Fellow at the Organization of American States (OAS), and a UK Chevening Alumni. Additionally, Marielos is a professor of geopolitics at Universidad del Valle in Guatemala and has recently completed the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) organized by the US Department of State.

 

This article is part of the Deep Dive “European Responses to Moments of Democratic Opportunity”.

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

Photo credit: © Shalom de León, Unsplash