A New Dynamic of Democratic Resilience?

A change in focus on global democracy is tentatively emerging. For a decade or more, most analytical and policy concern has been with negative trends. The concepts of autocratisation, democratic regression, and backsliding came to dominate debates on global political trends. Analysts, policymakers, journalists, and civil society organisations have been deeply immersed in unpacking the economic, political, and values-based dynamics driving the wave of autocratisation that has swept the world. The narrative of democratic erosion and autocratic surge has impacted international democracy-support calculations, media reporting, and analytical debates.

While autocratisation remains a pressing concern – especially in light of events in the United States since January 2025 – a parallel focus on democratic resilience has begun to emerge. This appears to represent a potential new stage in the study of democratisation, which has moved through phases: a focus on transitions led to the study of democratic consolidation, which then gave way to a concern with autocratisation, and now an incipient exploration of democratic resilience. The term resilience has been around for a long time and is used in many areas of scientific enquiry; different disciplines understand and use it in different ways. The term is now increasingly applied to trends in democracy and autocracy.

This is in part because many democracies have undergone crises without falling into autocracy, while a small number of states that had been autocratising have dramatically reversed course. Debates over such developments remain embryonic. They feature a plethora of related terms that refer to democracy’s resilience, recovery, turnarounds, bright spots, or moments of opportunity. Some cases of resilience consist of consolidated democracies resisting autocratisation while others entail a reversal of embedded autocratic dynamics.

In the hope of shedding light on this emerging debate, the European Democracy Hub invited prominent experts to comment on what they see as the core issues related to democratic resilience and how relevant this concept might be to future political developments around the world. We asked them to share their reflections on how democratic resilience should be understood, what definitions and terms they see as being most valuable, and what considerations warrant most attention in policy and analytical deliberations on resilience.

 

Types of democratic resilience

The emerging focus on democratic resilience is necessary because of the increased realisation that democratic institutions are never inherently self-reinforcing as democratic. Democratic institutions are susceptible to capture and to being used to shift the playing field in favour of an elected but autocratising incumbent.

What, then, are the sources and types of resilience that can help protect democracy from backsliding and to recover democracy after partial or complete autocratisation? Democratic resilience should not simply enable the survival of or the return to a flawed status quo. It should also provide the means to adapt to changing conditions and to innovate and improve democracy.

Given the strong correlation between democracy and economic development, it was long assumed that the latter was a source of democratic resilience. Yet, in our era of advanced global capital, the distributive conflicts mediated by political parties and class compromises are no longer the primary cleavage. Giving way to constitutive conflicts, political struggles increasingly centre on who makes up ‘the people’, who should be part of the citizenry and who are its enemies. Economic development, concentration of wealth and resources for incumbents to distribute can then be used for further institutional capture and contribute to backsliding rather than protect against it.

Democratic resilience can be found in society rather than in economic development. Social cohesion – the sense of belonging, connectedness, and commitment to a common purpose – provides an important source of resilience against attempts to divide and exclude. Agreement and commitment to the rules of the game are critical. Institutions can limit backsliding by diffusing and constraining power or by strengthening the capacity of opponents to block measures that cause backsliding.

We should differentiate between sources of democratic resilience and strategies of resistance to recover democratic practices and rights. The institutional and organisational factors of resilience include highly proportional electoral systems, multiple veto points that distribute power across different institutions, federalism and independent state or local governments, rules and professional associational networks that reinforce the independence of courts, vibrant and socially grounded opposition parties, independent media, and a legacy of mobilisation against authoritarian rule.

Resistance strategies interact with these potential sources of resilience. The sources of resilience shape calculations of resistance strategies: where strong repertoires of social mobilisation for democratic defence exist, political party leaders, judges, officials, legislators and others in institutional sites of contestation can draw strength from social demands to exert their autonomy and democratic potential. In combination with social mobilisation, several resilience factors structure the possibility for institutional checks to hold: the structure of court appointments, selection rules for political party leadership, military recruitment policies, independent media regulations, federal to local bureaucratic power relations, and so on.

Within the specific context of this constellation of resilience factors, resistance strategies are forged in the moment and over time in responsive sequences, shaping whether political parties are well positioned to form a broad anti-authoritarian coalition, whether the courts have independent and autonomous leaders in place, and whether a professionalised military will maintain the rule of law in protection of democracy and the people.

 

From electoral U-turns to re-democratisation

After two decades of democratic decline and authoritarian gains, the global democratic community is now turning its attention to opportunities for democratic renewal. This interest reflects an important counter-current in the ongoing autocratisation trend: the large number of countries where autocratising incumbents have been unseated and re-democratisation seems possible. In the last few years, governments widely viewed as presiding over democratic erosion have lost power in Bangladesh, Brazil, Mauritius, Poland, Senegal, and Zambia. These cases must be studied closely as they show how potential openings for re-democratisation present opportunities and risks that are distinct from those in original democratisation processes. There are three main lessons here for international donors and civil society groups.

First, achieving an electoral U-turn, while necessary, is not sufficient to trigger durable re-democratisation processes. The underlying dynamics that led to autocratisation must be understood and tackled. Otherwise, new governments that come to power promising to overturn repressive legislation, rein in the security forces, and/or combat corruption, ultimately face the same pressures and incentives to manipulate institutions and serve their clienteles, or they are simply unable to enact significant reform and prove ultimately disappointing to the citizenry. It is therefore important to keep in mind how quickly windows of democratic opportunity may close in countries like Senegal and Zambia, and to be realistic about what new governments are likely to deliver. It is also important to remember that autocratisers who are defeated at the ballot box remain politically active and can use unresolved societal divisions and disappointing governance from their opponents to return to power, as seen in Slovakia and the United States.

Second, even the most democratic new governments may be tempted to use authoritarian means to purge authoritarian elements from government institutions. In Brazil and Poland, for example, autocratising incumbents were defeated at the ballot box but left behind institutions packed with their allies. In such cases, it is tempting for the new government to act outside constitutional rules to rid institutions of individuals appointed by their predecessors. This undermines the institutionalisation of democratic practices and makes key institutions even more vulnerable to subversion in the future. As U-turns can be followed by new autocratising challenges, including the electoral comeback of the defeated autocratisers, ‘quick and dirty’ approaches to re-democratisation risk further politicising independent institutions, polarising society and weakening democratic guardrails.

Third, opposition parties usually work closely with civil society groups to achieve the shared goal of unseating autocratisers and restoring the rule of law. These bonds often mean that the defeat of autocratising governments at the polls leads to new openings for civic groups, leading to some of the most prominent and influential civil society leaders getting appointed to government positions. In turn, this can result in a process of co-option that limits the ability of key figures to speak out against new abuses, resulting in a less critical and robust civic sector.

In order to turn electoral U-turns into genuine opportunities for re-democratisation, pro-democracy actors, including donors, therefore, need to push for the repeal of authoritarian legislation to be completed as soon as is legally possible, support the development of constitutional arrangements that strengthen independent institutions and create the conditions for societal reconciliation, and consider supporting alternative civil society groups that have weaker ties to the new government. These lessons are vital as re-democratisation openings are likely to form a significant trend over the next decade. As more countries experience autocratisation episodes, there are more countries where there are possibilities for democratic bounce-backs.

 

Democratic recovery from elected autocrats

The burgeoning scholarly and policy attention to democratic resilience has focused primarily on sources of resistance to backsliding. Discussions of democratic recovery, particularly after elected autocrats leave power following electoral defeats, have been less prevalent. Until recently, such cases were relatively rare, in part because the phenomenon of elected autocrats was not widespread. Most authoritarian regimes were absolute rather than competitive and did not come about through the erosion of pre-existing democracy. However, as the number of elected autocrats has multiplied in the past 20 years, there is a small but growing number of cases of electoral defeat of such leaders followed by attempted recovery from the erosion they once imposed.

In a new paper, we examine the experience of recovery in four such cases—Brazil, Poland, Senegal, and Zambia. We identify what can be described as a ‘recovery playbook’: the inverse of the autocratic playbook that previously prevailed in these places. Central to the recovery playbook are efforts to re-establish democratic norms and behaviour in executive power; to restore media freedom, space for independent civil society and open political competition; to carry out anti-corruption reforms and investigations; and to re-democratise key governmental institutions. The playbook varies depending on the distinctive traits of the underlying process of autocratisation to which the recovery is responding.

Attempted democratic recoveries are confronted with various challenges. The biggest is pushback from the autocratising political forces that are now in the opposition, which occurs within governing processes as well as at the level of political narratives and messaging. Another major question for the new leadership is how much it should prioritise the re-democratisation effort versus focusing on socio-economic reforms that may be higher on the public’s list of concerns. This consideration is mediated by the nation’s pre-recovery landscape. In some countries, the voters who brought the new leadership into power were highly motivated by anger about ongoing democratic erosion; in others, such concerns were outweighed by frustration with economic mismanagement and corruption.

Pro-democracy reforms vary greatly in their degree of difficulty. Unwinding a prior process of compromising judicial independence, for example, is almost inevitably complex and fraught. Undoing efforts to stifle independent media, by contrast, may be relatively easier. A new leadership with re-democratisation intentions must also navigate its use of newly acquired power. While institutional reform efforts might necessitate a firm hand, the new leaders must be careful that their tactics do not veer into undemocratic overreach. Pro-democracy reformers sometimes face the temptation to hold on to institutional powers that were amassed by the prior regime. Backing away from such over-centralisation requires a firm adherence to democratic principles. It is notable that in all of the cases we examine, civil society actors have raised alarm bells about new forms of democratically questionable behaviour by the new power holders.

In short, while the “recovery playbook” is far from being a one-size-fits-all solution, close study of the growing set of recovery cases after the defeat of elected autocrats can illuminate the range of challenges and dynamics in this expanding realm.

 

The strategic importance of resilience in the democracy-security nexus

In addition to the factors identified in the above contributions, resilience is also related to the nexus between the democracy and security agendas. This has been particularly evident following Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and with the apparent growing coordination of an authoritarian alliance that is pushing Western liberal democracies, NATO, and European institutions to view the threat of authoritarianism as a key strategic concern.

Attempts to fuse democracy promotion and a securitisation agenda have fallen short. This is due to the former being articulated as a strategically important objective without being incorporated as an operational component into security strategy, to which it is, in fact, often sacrificed. In the current European context, everything – from Europe’s economy to its energy supply and its borders and seas – necessitates a security component if it is to fit within a holistic approach to a defence strategy. Today’s complex security landscape demands this, as much as it requires Europe to increase its military spending, to shore up its conventional military capabilities, and to achieve credible deterrence.

The democratic processes and institutions on which liberal societies are built have proven to be extremely vulnerable to many coercion tactics and forms of attack by authoritarian and autocratic actors. This calls for more resilience, and that is securitisation’s rightful place. At the strategic level, however, an exclusive focus on a defensive approach might hinder liberal democracies from capitalising on their biggest strategic asset: democracy itself.

Democracy needs protection but can also give liberal democracies a strategic edge in the current geopolitical landscape. The reason why is whole-of-society resilience, which is increasingly recognised as crucial to democracy and security agendas alike. Bolstering democratic resilience helps in strengthening the resilience and effectiveness of the security sector. Building whole-of-society resilience means rethinking the democracy-security nexus as a two-way street, asking not only how to secure democracies from external threats but also how to streamline democratic principles within security policies, partnerships, strategies, and sectors.

Democratic processes and the ethos that permeates them need to be strengthened in the pursuit of security aims. This requires paying attention to democracy’s procedural and substantive elements, as both are essential to resilience, which should be understood not as an impenetrable shield against systemic shocks or specific threats but rather as the capacity to withstand and quickly recover from them. And yet, discussions about interventions to bolster resilience and promote democracy have tended to focus on the former rather than the latter. When it comes to the role of resilience in the democracy-security nexus, this blind spot should not just be avoided but also countered.

In the current geopolitical landscape, defending democracy from the encroaching authoritarian threat cannot simply mean playing defence; it requires strategic thinking and better appreciation of the geostrategic environment and the underpinning dynamics within which today’s systemic competition is taking shape. This requires maximum investment in bolstering whole-of-society resilience at the democracy-security nexus, seeing democracy as Europe’s most significant strategic asset rather than a vulnerability to be defended, and promoting the ethos and the normative foundations on which liberal democracy is not only anchored but from which Europe derives its strategic interests and policy objectives.

 

An optimistic note: U-turns and international democracy protection

Democracies’ resilience to autocratisation is a paramount issue today. The United States is currently the most prominent example, with observers already describing what is happening as a coup in the making. While the final outcome of the high-profile, partly illegal dismantling of the US state is yet unknown, it makes the urgency of resilience more than palpable. As the world has been experiencing a third wave of autocratisation in the past 30 years, what can be done to protect democracy from it is an urgent agenda.

However, there is also good news. Resilience to autocratisation is much more common than perhaps previously thought. During this third wave, autocratisation starting in democracies was halted in 73 per cent of the 64 cases and there were U-turns towards more democratic regimes. Research into how these U-turns can succeed is in full swing. Initial findings allow conclusions to be drawn about where international democracy promotion can start to support local democratic forces and institutions. To successfully counter autocratisation, it is important to know which form of resilience is required.

The three known types of democratic resilience processes differ regarding their timing and the magnitude of their effects. The first is resilience to the onset of backsliding in established democracies. About half of the cases were resilient in this way. Examples include Costa Rica, Norway, and Taiwan.

The second is resilience in the face of democratic backsliding. In these cases, autocratisation was halted while the regime was still democratic, and the earlier levels of democracy were restored. This is a rare form of resilience so far. It accounts for eight out of the 64 cases. Examples include Brazil after the presidential election of 2022 and Poland since the parliamentary elections of 2023.

The third type of resilience is one that re-establishes democracy after a brief period of autocracy. This is the most common type of democratic resilience, with 27 cases where relatively swift U-turns back to democracy were made after autocratisation had led to democratic breakdown.

These three types of resilience fundamentally challenge the logic of action in international democracy promotion. Resilience has become a matter of protecting democracy from autocratisation. States aiming to protecting democracy often have to take action against sovereign partner states in international cooperation. International democracy protection must aim to prevent autocratisation; that is, to support resilience at its onset. However, there are also other ways to contribute to resilience and support U-turns.

Foremost is the old yet valid principle of staying engaged. During autocratisation, it is vital to encourage the preservation of institutional safeguards, such as constitutional rules which prevent the expansion of executive power. While spending taxpayers’ money in autocratic states is politically challenging, it is critical to remain active in newly autocratised countries to support pro-democracy individuals and organisations, in addition to any development cooperation with the government. Later, at the point where the U-curve turns upward, working with key change agents can build on the trust established during this engagement.

Given the frequency of U-turns, it is crucial to learn more about international support for them. Several research projects are underway in this area. However, whether and how international democracy protection can impact the United States, which until recently was the largest provider of democracy aid, remains an open question.

 

Taking advantage of democratic openings

Democratic openings are specific moments of political opportunity for democratic forces. Conventional wisdom suggests that there have been very few such moments over the last decade as authoritarian forces have taken the reins of power in more and more countries worldwide. Yet, these openings are surprisingly common. In 2024, citizens in Senegal and Sri Lanka voted out autocratising leaders, protesters toppled a dictatorship in Bangladesh, and voters in Botswana and South Africa voted for changes in their executive branches. Even if the world continues to autocratise in the coming years, there will be more such cases on an annual basis.

It is, therefore, vital to understand these moments of opportunity much better and to be able to work with pro-democracy forces in their struggle for more open and transparent politics. So, what makes these openings distinctive?

First, democratic openings are diverse in that they can represent an incipient democratic recovery or U-turn (like in Brazil and Poland in 2023) or a simple transfer of power via elections (like in Botswana and South Africa in 2024) or a classic democratisation process from authoritarianism towards democratic politics (like in Ethiopia in 2018 or Sudan in 2019). Examples of the latter bring the study of democracy full circle and hark back to debates about transition in the 1990s. But what unites all of these examples is a change in the executive branch of government. This change brings the chance to affect significant reforms to the body politic and the structures of national governance. Without this, the opening is unlikely to lead to lasting pro-democracy change.

But democratic openings do not appear out of thin air. In Bangladesh and Sri Lanka changes to the executive branch resulted from powerful protest movements. In Bangladesh, this led to rather rapid change over a several months in 2024, while in Sri Lanka, widespread protests in 2022 played a major role in the landslide election of a new president in 2024. Changes in the executive branch may take a long time to materialise, and democratic forces will often be on the rise prior to the democratic opening. Support for such forces is, therefore, vital if the autocratic door is to be pushed ajar.

Second, these openings are often fleeting. They do not always lead to long-term democratic change because, while it may be a straightforward discipline, politics is a very complicated profession. Those behind the change need to show resilience to push back against rival forces almost immediately. Rarely is there a battle between clearly demarcated democratic and authoritarian forces. As a result, many of these openings do not lead to more accountable, participatory, or representative governance (see the Arab Spring).

Pro-democracy forces – whether they be politicians, civic actors, companies, or donors – need to act fast and decisively when openings arise due to the fact that these are highly contingent moments. A key feature of democratic openings is that lasting political change requires strong democratic agents acting in a timely manner.

Development and democracy under Trump

Few claims in social science are as well supported as the one that high levels of economic development foster democratic stability. In the 65 years since the publication of Seymour Martin Lipset’s ground-breaking essay on the social prerequisites of democracy, a large body of research has demonstrated a robust relationship between economic modernisation and democracy. Excluding oil states, virtually all high-income states are democratic today. Drawing on historical data, Daniel Treisman has argued that the chances of democratic breakdown in the United States are extremely low.

Yet, American democracy is obviously in crisis. Despite the country’s wealth and democratic history, President Donald Trump has already done serious damage to the system – threatening opposition, bullying independent media, and weaponising the state. The failure of democracy despite strong prerequisites can better be understood by spelling out the precise mechanisms linking development and democracy. As Steven Levitsky and I (building on Robert Dahl) argue, capitalist economic development fosters democracy less by encouraging tolerance and much more by reducing citizens’ dependence on the state and dispersing resources across society. The pluralistic social order that emerges out of high levels of economic development fosters autonomous citizenries, independent centres of wealth, dense associational landscapes, and collective mobilisational capacity that create the structural bases for robust opposition. All of this makes it extremely hard for any single party or leader to monopolise political power.

At the same time, the structural bases for democracy leave at least two key sources of vulnerability to democratic breakdown. First, development does little to mitigate the polarisation that has crippled American democracy. Polarisation encourages politicians and their supporters to view political rivals as illegitimate and existential threats to their way of life. It, therefore, weakens democratic norms and fosters support for nondemocratic measures to prevent the other side from gaining power. Polarisation is likely one factor that has encouraged many citizens to support Trump’s openly authoritarian behaviour.

Second, even in high-income countries with rich and powerful private sectors, governments possess significant leverage over businesses via the tax system, government contracts, and regulatory control, leaving them vulnerable to pressure. As we are now witnessing in the United States, such leverage gives government actors powerful tools to discourage dissent and undermine democracy. Thus, the Trump administration has used its economic power to cow major media. For example, Jeff Bezos, who owns The Washington Post, controls two companies – Amazon and Blue Origin – that are deeply affected by decisions of the federal government. Such exposure very likely influenced Bezos’s decision to quash The Washington Post’s planned endorsement of Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris. Similarly, in late 2024, ABC chose to settle a defamation suit brought by Trump. CBS is also considering settling a frivolous suit brought by Trump in order to avoid potential opposition to a major merger. Such incidents suggest that American media are likely to engage in significant self-censorship during Trump’s term in office.

 

Authors

 

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

Photo credit: ©Marc Sendra Martorell, unsplash