Election Observation and Hybrid Threats

From the outset, the so-called super-year of elections in 2024 promised to be a nerve-racking democratic marathon across the globe. Looking back, it was maybe the electoral showdowns in eastern Europe and the south Caucasus that sent the most acute shivers through European democrats.

In Georgia, the contested victory of the pro-Russia Georgian Dream party in October’s parliamentary election was followed by crackdowns on peaceful protests in Tbilisi. In Moldova, where President Maia Sandu was re-elected and narrowly won a referendum to embed the goal of EU membership in the country’s constitution, foreign interference took centre stage. And in Romania, the second round of the presidential election was cancelled after accusations of Russian influence. The combined havoc wreaked by these three votes highlighted a trend that is emerging with troubling clarity: hybrid threats in elections are getting serious.

The annual conference of the European Platform for Democratic Elections, held in Brussels in December 2024 with a focus on election observation and hybrid threats, could not have come at a more appropriate time. Bringing together policymakers and practitioners, the conference provided an opportunity to kick-start deliberations on the roles of international and citizen observers in an increasingly complicated geopolitical context marked by democratic backsliding.

Are election observers ready for hybrid threats?

In electoral contexts, the term “hybrid threats” refers to coordinated action by hostile actors who use a diverse set of tools and tactics to exploit vulnerabilities in an election with the aim to undermine the integrity of the process and/or the results. Such threats have received increasing attention since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. So where does election observation stand today?

The known knowns

Let’s start with the good news: election observers already understand and are assessing the key elements of hybrid threats to elections. Over recent years, international and citizen observers alike have come a long way in getting to grips with some areas that are integral to hybrid threat regimes. These include social media, campaign financing, and the security of technological infrastructure in elections. As hybrid tactics evolve, it will be important to constantly review and update assessment tools to keep up to speed with the developments.

The known unknowns

Then there are manipulation techniques of which observers are aware but whose nature and effects they have not yet fully understood. One example is covert political funding; another could be the use of AI in elections. How different tactics are used in a coordinated fashion may also fall into this category. Gaining a clearer understanding of such techniques could require methodological innovation and, perhaps, a stronger focus on actors beyond the usual suspects, such as security agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) involved in digital rights.

The unknown unknowns

Most challenging, though, is to prepare for so-called black swan scenarios, which involve the deployment of unprecedented and improbable manipulation tactics. Assessing such events may require not only methodological flexibility, allowing observers to go beyond their usual practices, but also unique talent among experts and a pinch of luck. Maybe it is too much to ask.

Election observation can only do so much

Election observers cannot do it all. Investigating opaque illicit financial flows and cybercrimes involving foreign states and criminal gangs, as well as tech platforms’ ability to operate within the law, remains a task for relevant national agencies. That said, in December 2024 the European Commission launched an investigation into TikTok for a suspected breach of the EU’s Digital Services Act in the context of the Romanian presidential election; this decision shows that the EU is ready to act when member states are affected.

Election observation operates with numerous restrictions. International missions are on the ground for relatively short periods of time, often two or three months, and issue their preliminary conclusions just a couple of days after polling. Citizen observation is more flexible and benefits from deeper insights into local political power plays but often lacks the resources to take monitoring to the next level.

For both international and citizen observers, the spillover of elections into the realm of national security is posing challenges in terms of access to institutions and information.

The case for giving it a shot

Despite these hurdles, organisations that are engaged in election observation should be wary of letting hybrid threats linger, as this could erode the credibility of election observation itself. In contexts where hybrid threats loom large, leaving the challenges to one side risks making observation irrelevant. To remain an effective tool in the democracy-protection toolbox, these missions must stay attuned to evolving threats.

Election observers should step up their game and investigate more thoroughly how to include hybrid threats in their assessments, taking into consideration existing international standards for the organisation of credible elections. Do these threats to election integrity require new tools and skill sets?

Organisations that deploy international election observation missions may benefit from more flexible approaches when making decisions on missions’ shape and format. For example, where the likelihood and impact of hybrid tactics are considered high, organisations could explore the possible benefits of phased or staggered deployment or thematically focused missions to channel resources and capacities more effectively.

International observers should also continue working closely with citizen observers, who are better positioned to develop and apply sophisticated methodologies for monitoring hybrid threats to assess their impact on electoral integrity. Related to this, the international community should ensure that civil society organisations and citizen observers working at the democracy-security nexus have adequate resources to stay abreast of the latest developments.

 

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This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

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