Elene Panchulidze

On 26 October 2024, Georgia held high-stakes elections widely regarded as a showdown between autocratic Russia and democratic Europe. Amid widespread allegations of electoral irregularities, Georgia’s capital yet again was rocked by protests. Thousands of Georgians took to the streets with slogans like ‘We do not trust’, along with President Salome Zourabichvili and key opposition party leaders who refused to recognise the results.

In contrast to the small circle of mostly authoritarian-leaning allies of the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party in Russia, Azerbaijan, and Hungary, the reports from different elections observation missions (EOMs) caused an international outcry over alleged electoral manipulation. The response from EU member states has become more assertive and coherent as local observers exposed a scheme of mass fraud and called for an investigation and the annulment of ballots cast by over 300,000 voters.

As Georgians brace for what they see as a tough and final stand for democracy, many also fear the EU is ceding influence in the country to Russia and that it has shown little commitment to safeguarding the democratic future of an accession country. While support for democratic norms appears to be increasingly deprioritised in the new European Commission’s agenda, the question is whether the EU will consider the battle over Georgia’s democratic trajectory vital to its geopolitical interests.

‘Georgians, like all Europeans, must be the masters of their own destiny’, stated European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and she called for an independent and immediate probe into election violations. Yet, Georgian politicians argue that asking autocratic leaders to investigate the very irregularities they skilfully planned and executed is both ‘insufficient and ineffective’.

Given all this, the European Democracy Hub asked Georgian experts working in Brussels on the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood, EU foreign policy, and democracy to contextualise the election results and reflect upon the potential responses from the EU and the international community to support the Georgian people’s quest for a democratic future.

 

Escalating flaws in the Georgian electoral system

Photo of Ana Andguladze
Ana Andguladze

Early in 2024, the V-Dem Institute listed Georgia as a ‘near miss Autocratization’ case. It stated that Georgia’s electoral processes have been its ‘greatest flaws’ and warned of the country’s trajectory towards autocratisation. In this election cycle, the faults within Georgia’s electoral system became a catalyst for a significant blow to its backsliding democracy.

The reports from local and international observers list numerous severe violations preceding the elections and on election day itself. Georgia’s contested elections point to an increasingly acknowledged problem regarding monitoring processes: elections are rarely rigged on election day. Due to autocratic innovations, the integrity of elections is undermined before then. At the same time, strategies and mechanisms for influencing the final result become increasingly sophisticated and challenging to detect.

The Georgian case may serve as yet another lesson for the international democracy support community. There is an urgent need to be a step ahead of wannabe autocrats. The international approach regarding election monitoring processes and support for local pro-democratic actors should be adapted to ever-changing domestic realities.

Georgian pro-democratic actors now face the daunting task of resisting a regime attempting to consolidate power for another four years. After President Salome Zourabichvili and the opposition parties contested the legitimacy of the election results, citizens have taken to the streets to protest and defend their right to free and fair elections. As they face frustration and uncertainty, the EU and the international community cannot afford ambiguity in its statements. They should prepare their responses to different scenarios unfolding in Georgia, including the intensification of repression amid the protests or potential Russian interference.

 

The EU failing against democratic backsliding

Photo of Mariam Khotenashvili
Mariam Khotenashvili

Entrenched in power since 2012 and increasingly dictatorial, the Georgian Dream party has a reliable supporter in the EU. His name is Viktor Orbán, and as friends do, he arrived in Tbilisi on 28 October in order to lend legitimacy to the official results of parliamentary elections, in which Georgian Dream secured victory through numerous irregularities, including a large scheme of multiple voting and physical intimidation of voters and observers.

The Georgian people, meanwhile, have been left with brief statements and tweets from EU leaders expressing ‘hopes’ – hopes that the Central Election Commission investigates electoral irregularities, hopes for a ‘constructive and inclusive dialogue’ across the political spectrum (Charles Michel), and hopes that Georgia adopts ‘democratic, comprehensive and sustainable reforms, in line with the core principles of European integration’ (Josep Borrell). In the absence of a clear strategy, vision or foresight regarding Georgia (and other Eastern Neighbourhood countries), the EU’s institutions could at least spare themselves the hypocrisy of pinning ‘hopes’ on a regime that has long unmasked itself.

The EU has repeatedly failed to see the obvious. Based on the experience of the adoption of the Transparency of Foreign Influence law this spring and of recent changes to the electoral code, it should have been clear well ahead of the elections that Georgian Dream was determined to rig the results as much as necessary to remain in power. It was also clear that it would get support from Russia’s security services and state propaganda apparatus, intimidate and pressure citizens into voting for it, work to minimise election monitoring, and manipulate the vote count as needed. It was clear that the opposition did not face a level playing field. But instead of investigating and challenging the government’s actions in the run-up to the elections, the EU only supported the deployment of a standard-size observation mission under the coordination of the OSCE ODIHR – the routine approach.

The EU waited for Georgian Dream to rig the elections. Now the EU will wait again – this time for a EUCO meeting in November, which most likely will reiterate its hopes and formulate possible punishments, such as removing visa liberalisation, which would be an incredibly misguided idea, rubbing salt into pro-EU Georgians’ wounds. We might also hear explanations as to why EU sanctions against regime actors are off the table and be reminded about the unanimity requirement in the Council.

The EU boasts about having revived its enlargement policy and acting geopolitically. But if it cannot engage with Georgia’s population meaningfully, if it shies away from engaging with local actors representing the EU agenda, and if Georgian Dream gets its way with the legitimising of the rigged elections, then this will be a signal from the EU to all accession countries. It will say to them that enlargement is a fair-weather process and that the EU is powerless against, and indifferent about, democratic backsliding and Russia’s destabilising interference.

 

Elections as a test for Georgia's democratic turnaround

Tinatin Tsertsvadzetinatin.
Tinatin Tsertsvadze

The elections were a test for Georgia’s future foreign policy orientation and potential democratic turnaround. Once a frontrunner in democratic reforms, the country has experienced slow but steady democratic decline, the capture of its state institutions, and widespread polarisation.

The Central Election Commission announced the ruling Georgian Dream party won over 54 per cent of the vote, leaving the pro-European opposition parties that cleared the 5 per cent threshold with a combined 37 per cent of the vote. These elections were the first since Georgia received the status of EU candidate country, although this was de facto suspended following the adoption of the Transparency of Foreign Influence law, which was widely regarded as an anti-democratic law aimed at tightening the ruling party’s grip over civil society and critical media in the run-up to the elections.

The first technical assessments by different election observation missions on 27 October noted numerous violations both in the pre-election period and on election day itself. The international response has remained cautious, mainly citing the findings of the OSCE/ODIHR and calling relevant authorities to investigate allegations of widespread violations. President Salome Zourabichvili and opposition parties do not recognise the election outcomes and have called for protests.

The EU and the international community’s solidarity with the thousands of Georgian voters, who overwhelmingly support the country’s European integration, is crucial. The Georgian people need the EU and the international community to stand by them, to help reverse the country’s democratic decline and to resume the EU integration processes. This can be achieved by ensuring the independence of state institutions and repealing undemocratic laws.

 

Tactics of election manipulation

Photo of Dr. Tinatin Akhvlediani
Tinatin Akhvlediani

The reported election irregularities were unsurprising, given that Georgian Dream (GD) has mastered election falsification over the past decade. Its campaign relied heavily on fear, blaming the opposition’s ‘Global War Party’ for the war in Ukraine and displaying billboards contrasting war-torn Ukrainian cities with peaceful Georgian ones, echoing the Kremlin-style disinformation observed in the run-up to Moldova’s presidential election and referendum a few days earlier.

As the elections neared, GD intensified its vote-buying, recruited criminal networks by releasing thousands of prisoners and secured the Georgian Orthodox Church’s support with agricultural land gifts. Administrative resources were exploited, civil servants threatened, ID cards confiscated, and citizens’ data harvested from public institutions. Over 90 per cent of the votes were cast electronically, adding a perhaps untraceable layer of sophistication to potential vote rigging. With all the fraud, the polls estimated GD’s support to be around 40 per cent, a level similar to the exit poll forecast on election day. Yet GD somehow received 54 per cent of the vote share. President Salome Zourabichvili labelled this a ‘special Russian operation’.

Despite the opposition parties’ refusal to recognise the results and to take up their mandates, GD can still launch the new parliament. But its unfettered rule will completely derail Georgia from its European path and will snuff out Georgian democracy.

Against this background, the EU should not legitimise the elections, and it should issue targeted sanctions against GD officials responsible for rigging the elections. The EU should also enhance its support for Georgia’s civil society and independent media, which are under direct threat from the infamous ‘Foreign Agents’ law.

 

Elene Panchulidze is the Research Coordinator at European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) where she oversees global research on democracy and leads the European Democracy Hub initiative. Panchulidze is also an Associate Fellow at PMC Research Center and Affiliated Policy Analyst at the Georgian Institute of Politics. She has a decade of professional experience in research and policy analysis, and has led many international research projects on EU foreign policy, democracy, civil society and gender. Prior to joining EPD, Panchulidze worked at the European Endowment for Democracy, College of Europe in Bruges, EU Delegation to Georgia, and at the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission to Georgia.

Ana Andguladze is a researcher at the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB). Her research interests include opposition to democratic backsliding, civil society, EU enlargement, and the Eastern Partnership initiative. Her academic work has been published in European Politics and Society and Palgrave Macmillan. She is the author of multiple policy-oriented publications for various think tanks, such as the European Policy Centre (EPC), the European Liberal Forum (ELF) and the Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP). As a graduate of the College of Europe, Ana brings a mix of academic and practical experience with a diverse background in the public and non-governmental sectors. In addition to her ongoing doctoral research, she has several years of experience teaching in academia.

Mariam Khotenashvili is Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA)’s Executive Director. She is responsible for the daily management of the association. Mariam is in close contact with the TEPSA Board and member institutes regarding TEPSA’s strategic and annual planning and oversees the implementation of TEPSA’s projects. She liaises with TEPSA’s member institutes, promoting visibility of their research findings and helping to bridge academic research with policy-making. Mariam also contributes to the coordination of the biannual TEPSA Pre-Presidency Conferences and hosts TEPSA’s video-series, EuropeChats.

Tinatin Tsertsvadze is an Advocacy Advisor at the Open Society Foundations. She is responsible for EU sanctions policies, and also has thematic expertise in human rights, civil society space, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Prior to joining Open Society, she worked for the International Partnership for Human Rights, focusing on Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia as an Advocacy Director and Gender Adviser for five years. She worked at FRIDE, between 2010 – 2014, as Central Asia programme manager and conducted research and advocacy on EU policies towards Central Asia and the South Caucasus. She co-managed a 50-member network of Brussels-based HRDN network between 2016-2019. Prior to that Tinatin worked for the European Socialist Party, assisting in the 2009 European Parliament Election campaign. She also served one year as the Brussels director for European Institutions at AEGEE. She has a master’s degree in public administration (specialising in European Studies) from the Georgian University.

Dr. Tinatin Akhvlediani is a Research Fellow in the EU Foreign Policy Unit at Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), specialising in the EU’s enlargement, neighbourhood, and trade policies. Her regional expertise is focused on the EU’s Eastern neighborhood and Ukraine. With a rich academic and policy background, she has published extensively in these areas, actively engages in high-level policy debates, and frequently offers insights through major media outlets, including BBC, Euronews, and Bloomberg. In 2023, Dr. Akhvlediani was recognized among the most prominent and promising women in the EU, sharing this distinction with notable figures such as the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. In 2020, she earned a place on Forbes Georgia’s “30 Under 30” list, highlighting her exceptional contributions to the field of social sciences.

 

Photo credit: Jelger Groeneveld, 2024, flickr