From Soft Sanctions to Engagement: The EU’s Evolving Responses to Thailand’s Democratic Openings

Electoral opportunities and authoritarian resilience

Thailand’s political order has long been defined by the intertwined dominance of the monarchy and military rule, which together sustain the country’s authoritarian foundations. Short-lived democratic experiments in the 1930s, 1970s, and 1990s repeatedly faced fierce resistance from these entrenched institutions. The democratic openings of the 1990s, particularly, hardened the elites’ opposition to what they saw as untamed democracy, which threatened to re-engineer the political order to their detriment.

From 2005 to 2014, episodes of polarisation, street clashes, and government instability culminated in two military coups. The second of these ushered in five years of military dictatorship, during which the junta systematically dismantled Thailand’s fledgling democratic institutions. Emerging civic freedoms, including those of expression, assembly, and association, were severely curtailed. To secure its power beyond direct military rule, the regime enacted a constitution designed to weaken the political-party system and fair elections, weaponised laws and the judiciary to suppress dissent, and packed supposedly independent agencies and the unelected senate with loyalists.

Despite – or perhaps because of – this concentration of power, two significant opportunities for democratic turnaround emerged. First, the 2019 general election failed to deliver substantive change, as General Prayut Chan-ocha retained power as the leader of the ruling coalition. However, this period saw rising popular grievances against the regime. The constitutional court’s dissolution in February 2020 of the Future Forward Party (FFP), a key opposition force, catalysed nationwide protests in 2020 and 2021. Demonstrators questioned not only the government’s legitimacy but also the monarchy’s role in Thai politics. While these protests disrupted the regime’s narrative and broke a long-standing taboo, they achieved no structural changes. The junta’s constitution remained intact, and power continued to be concentrated in the hands of the elites.

The second opportunity for democratic turnaround came with the 2023 election. The dissolved FFP was reincarnated as the Move Forward Party (MFP), which channelled public frustration over the regime’s mishandling of the Covid-19 pandemic and its economic fallout. The MFP won the most votes in the election and seemed poised to lead a ruling coalition. But political manoeuvring undercut these democratic aspirations. The second-placed Pheu Thai Party (PTP), formerly an opposition force, turned its back on the MFP and formed a coalition with pro-establishment parties, including Prayut’s.

While the MFP was relegated to the opposition, the PTP-led coalition still represented a small but symbolic step towards democratic opening after years of military rule. For many, elections remained a beacon of hope for eroding the authoritarian order incrementally.

This optimism, however, was soon eclipsed by the resilience of authoritarian gatekeepers. Key institutions, including the senate, the election commission, the constitutional court, and other junta-appointed agencies, leveraged the constitution to undermine democratic actors and institutions. The turning point came in August 2024, when the constitutional court disbanded the MFP and removed the PTP’s prime minister, opaquely citing allegations of anti-monarchy activities and ethical violations, respectively. These rulings effectively wiped out the 2023 election result, signalling to all political actors that their survival depended on adherence to the authoritarian status quo.

European democracy support

Democracy efforts in Thailand are supported by the European Union (EU), EU member states, the EU delegation in the country, and other like-minded states, such as Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). Yet, these efforts are far from unified.

The EU and its member states approach democracy support in Thailand through economic partnerships; international frameworks, particularly those focused on human rights; and Thailand’s commitments as a signatory to various rights-based conventions. Diplomats tread carefully when referencing democracy support or disclosing financial details about such efforts, as Thai elites and conservative segments of the population often view western involvement in domestic affairs with scepticism. This suspicion is rooted in a national discourse that prioritises sovereignty, a sentiment shaped by Thailand’s historical narrative as the only southeast Asian nation to have avoided European colonisation in the 18th and 19th centuries.

During Thailand’s two opportunities for democratic turnaround, EU actors engaged with policymakers and applied pressure in response to human rights violations. More discreetly, various European embassies also supported rights advocates and maintained active dialogues with opposition party members.

The first opportunity: The 2019 election and the 2020–21 protests

Alongside the US, the EU imposed economic and political restrictions on Thailand after the 2014 coup. These restrictions excluded the country from the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences – a move that led to the loss of Thailand’s tariff privileges – and paused both the signing of a partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) and negotiations on a free-trade agreement.

These soft sanctions by the US and the EU pushed Thailand closer to China out of diplomatic and economic necessity. Recognising a shifting geopolitical climate, the EU signalled a resumption of relations in December 2017, shortly after Thailand passed a new constitution, on the condition that an election would be held.

In 2019, Thailand held its first election after five years of military rule. The junta and its ally, the election commission, had resisted international requests to observe the vote. Thailand’s foreign minister openly rejected external observers, citing potential meddling in the country’s internal affairs. The EU did not send an election observation mission because it had not received Thailand’s official invitation on time; such missions include the deployment of long-term observers ahead of an election and therefore require advance preparation.

The EU and its member states expressed concerns over allegations that the election was marred by irregularities and a lack of transparency. Nonetheless, the EU cautiously re-engaged with the Thai government, welcoming Thailand’s transition to civilian rule despite minimal change in the ruling coalition. In October 2019, the EU announced its readiness to sign the PCA and resume the free-trade talks.

In contrast to this measured approach during the election, the EU and its member states strongly condemned violations of democratic norms and human rights after the constitutional court’s dissolution of the MFP and the subsequent youth-led protests. European engagement took two main forms, which often involved opposition parties and civil society stakeholders.

First, leading figures of the FFP (and, later, the MFP) actively engaged with EU countries’ embassies and, in the case of Germany and the Nordic countries, political foundations. The party sought alliances with democracies not only in Europe but also across Asia and aspired to model itself on progressive European parties. This constructive relationship, coupled with the FFP’s emergence as a rising opposition force, made its disbanding in 2020 a flashpoint. The move drew criticism from the EU, the US, the UK, and some countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for violating the electoral rights of the party’s voters.

Second, EU member states, to varying degrees, supported domestic human rights initiatives in the wake of a growing trend of judicial intimidation. Embassy representatives worked to maintain both a physical and a political safe space for young activists who faced serious charges under Thailand’s lèse-majesté laws. Diplomats often observed trials and engaged in dialogue with Thai lawmakers about proposed legislation, such as a controversial law on non-governmental organisations that risked stifling civil society. Having been tabled in 2021, the bill was dropped the following year.

However, as legal matters are considered domestic issues, EU member states were cautious in addressing them directly, preferring to employ international mechanisms. For instance, through a United Nations (UN) forum in 2021, EU member states raised concerns about Thailand’s extensive use of lèse-majesté and recommended that the Thai government modify the law to protect the freedoms of expression and assembly.

Similarly, the EU and its member states reacted to rights violations by leveraging international frameworks. After the violent dispersal of peaceful protests in October and November 2020, the EU issued statements urging the Thai government to uphold its commitments under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

Meanwhile, demonstrators strategically involved European embassies to draw international attention to police crackdowns. On 26 October, protesters marched on the German embassy in Bangkok to voice concerns over the palace’s growing political influence and highlight the Thai king’s residence in southern Germany. The embassy accepted the protesters’ petition, but the official response came from Berlin, where a German parliament committee investigated whether the king had violated Germany’s ban on conducting political activities during his stays in the country. Cautious to avoid diplomatic tensions, the committee found no evidence to support the allegation.

The second opportunity: The 2023 election and its aftermath

Democracy efforts in Thailand in 2019–21 laid the groundwork for more consolidated efforts during the 2023 election and for the advocacy of human rights. As the country’s political climate became less restrictive than it had been before the 2019 election, the EU delegation and European embassies seized the opportunity to broaden their engagement with the election commission to ensure a fair and transparent procedure. They also extended support to civil society watchdog initiatives, such as We Watch, a local election-monitoring group. EU actors further engaged with representatives of both opposition and pro-establishment political parties, including the Bhumjaithai Party and the Democrat Party, both of which had previously been part of the military-backed ruling coalition.

These interactions underscored the potential for a more democratic Thailand in the broader context of deeper EU-Thailand cooperation in areas like trade, energy, climate change, and gender equality. The 2023 election marked a significant moment, with turnout of over 75%. The Asian Network for Free Elections commended the 2023 election as “more transparent” than that of 2019.

The negotiations that led the second-placed PTP to form a coalition with pro-establishment parties defied the expectations of European embassies, but this arrangement nonetheless adhered to the electoral process. In parallel, the EU continued the process of finalising the PCA, which started in June 2023 when the European Parliament gave its consent to the agreement, and advanced its strategic collaboration with Thailand within ASEAN. Bilateral visits between the new Thai prime minister, Srettha Thavisin, and the leaders of France and Germany in 2023 and early 2024 yielded critical progress on economic and defence partnerships.

This second democratic opportunity was, however, overturned. In August 2024, the constitutional court dissolved the MFP and removed Srettha from the premiership. Before the rulings, MFP leaders had met with diplomats from the embassies of 18 like-minded nations, including EU countries, Canada, Japan, South Korea, and the US, to rally support against the party’s looming disbanding. In response, establishment supporters accused the MFP of conspiring with western powers to undermine the Thai monarchy. When the rulings were announced on 7 August, the EU, the UK, and the US openly condemned the decisions as a blow to “democratic pluralism”.

These condemnations did not result in punitive measures, such as the soft sanctions imposed after the 2014 coup, for two key reasons. First, while the judicial rollback of electoral gains undermined Thailand’s democratic integrity, it did not completely dismantle democracy, as military coups do. The PTP continues to lead the ruling coalition under the new prime minister, Paetongtarn Shinawatra. Second, the EU and its member states sought to avoid isolating Thailand amid geopolitical competition and China’s growing influence in southeast Asia. As such, the EU shifted from its previous stick-based approach to the 2014–19 junta towards prioritising Thailand’s integration into the rules-based international order.

An illustrative example of this shift is the continuation of bilateral economic collaboration through the PCA negotiations. Just weeks after the constitutional court’s rulings, on 29 August 2024 the Thai parliament approved the agreement, reinforcing Thailand’s bid for membership of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Although some EU member states still had to ratify the PCA as of January 2025, key terms of the agreement have been provisionally applied since October 2024. PCA working groups are reportedly about to be established, accelerating economic, climate, and geopolitical cooperation between Thailand and the EU. Moreover, the PCA is expected to serve as a platform for dialogue, including on sensitive issues, such as human rights.

Similarly, EU democracy support is currently embedded in the union’s broader human rights framework, which aligns with efforts to integrate Thailand into the international community. The Paetongtarn-led government has shown some openness to dialogue on human rights, particularly in the areas of social and economic rights – a notable shift from the previous military rule. For instance, in January 2025, the ruling coalition enacted a law on same-sex marriage, a bill proposed in 2022 but rejected by the then military-backed government. The EU and its member states, particularly Germany and Sweden, have supported Thailand’s LGBTQ+ rights advocates and welcomed this legislative success. In its 2023 human rights report, the EU commended the new law as a step towards “Thailand’s alignment with major international human rights”.

As part of an integrative approach, EU member states supported Thailand’s bid for a seat on the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) for the 2025–27 term, a campaign that culminated in the country’s successful election to the council in October 2024. In pursuit of HRC membership, the Thai government took steps to meet the council’s requirements, a move that may have prompted the implementation of the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act in February 2023 and the adoption of a second National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights in July of the same year.

Compared with the previous military rule, Thailand’s current, less restrictive political climate has provided the EU with more space to engage in constructive dialogue with Thai state agencies. For instance, the EU’s engagement with the justice ministry offers an avenue to discuss the use of legal mechanisms to stifle civil society. Additionally, EU actors can provide substantial financial support for human rights organisations, possibly with less concern about state scrutiny. Remarkably, the EU and the Sweden fund a significant portion of the operational costs of the representation in Thailand of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Assessment of EU support for Thailand

The EU’s responses to Thailand’s moments of democratic opportunity can be assessed along three dimensions: the timing of the EU’s earlier rapprochement, the nature of the union’s democracy-support approach, and the structural and geopolitical constraints within which the EU operates.

The timing of normalisation

Whether the EU’s normalisation of relations with Thailand in 2017 was premature or overdue depends on the perspective taken. For some rights advocates and members of the Thai opposition, the resumption of diplomatic ties was too soon, as the junta exploited the opportunity to claim international legitimacy, ultimately prolonging its rule until March 2019. Despite the general election that year, the junta’s influence continued to cast a long shadow over the new government.

In the context of intensifying geopolitical competition, in which global powers are increasingly divided into democratic and authoritarian camps, one could argue that the normalisation came too late. Isolated from its traditional western allies, Thailand’s junta deepened its partnership with China, which it lauded as a model of an economically successful autocracy. Although Thailand has historically pursued a policy of so-called bamboo diplomacy, balancing major powers’ influence, the country’s diplomatic isolation during this period pushed it closer to Beijing.

The EU’s adoption of an engagement-oriented approach after the 2019 election suggests a broad recognition that normalising relations earlier might have prevented Thailand from further entrenching its dependence on China.

The nature of the EU’s approach

Given Thailand’s sensitivity to western interference, the EU and its member states have strategically anchored their democracy and human rights initiatives in established international frameworks. EU statements that address human rights violations, such as the judicial intimidation of dissidents, are strictly grounded in the ICCPR. Diplomats who attend the court trials of dissidents tread carefully to avoid accusations of meddling in Thailand’s domestic affairs.

Similarly, the EU’s stance during the 2023 election campaign was based on internationally recognised principles of electoral integrity. After the constitutional court’s 2024 rulings to dissolve the MFP and remove the prime minister from office, the EU’s response focused on how these decisions undermined the principle of democratic pluralism. This approach, which was largely restrained and diplomatic, fell short of imposing punitive measures to curb threats to democratic institutions.

Despite the EU’s light-touch response, Thailand’s political establishment and its nationalist grass-roots cheerleaders frequently accuse EU member states and like-minded countries of undermining Thailand’s sovereignty. Given this political reality, a more cautious, hands-off approach may be necessary for the EU to uphold international norms while avoiding diplomatic friction.

At the same time, continued European support for civil society initiatives and engagement with multiple political factions may deter more drastic reversals of democratic progress, such as a military coup. Still, as is often the case in Thailand, external actors can only do so much to tackle the deep-seated legacies of the 2014–19 military rule.

Structural challenges and opportunities

European democracy support in Thailand operates within two main structural and geopolitical constraints that limit its ability to drive significant democratic change. First, while Thailand is no longer under direct military rule and, compared with its neighbours, offers a relatively open civic space, the authoritarian legacy of the junta remains deeply entrenched. Political and economic power is still concentrated in unelected institutions – the monarchy, the military, and the judiciary – which maintain control through allied political parties.

Although Thai citizens can vote for their preferred candidates, electoral outcomes are often subject to manipulation, with winning parties vulnerable to dissolution at the hands of the establishment elite. Dissidents who challenge the status quo continue to face criminalisation. At best, Thailand can be characterised as a defective democracy; at worst, as a form of competitive authoritarianism in which an electoral façade masks the persistence of elite control.

This carefully managed system allows the ruling establishment to avoid the diplomatic isolation imposed on past military juntas while still limiting genuine democratic competition. For the EU, this poses a dilemma: how to effectively support local pro-democracy actors without being accused of interfering in Thailand’s domestic affairs.

The second constraint is that even if the EU had the political will to intensify its engagement, doing so would require a comprehensive strategy. Such a strategy would need to include sustained dialogue with a broad range of stakeholders, cross-ideological engagement, and long-term coordination among EU member states.

The extent to which the EU is willing to invest in such efforts is ultimately shaped by geopolitical considerations. Thailand’s geographic distance from Europe means that its democratic trajectory – or lack thereof – does not directly affect the EU’s immediate crises, such as the war in Ukraine or democratic backsliding in the Middle East and north Africa. Whether the EU will recalibrate its geopolitical priorities to place greater emphasis on Thailand and the broader ASEAN region depends on evolving strategic calculations.

Conclusion

Despite the challenges it poses, Thailand’s current political opening presents opportunities to strengthen the social and economic foundations necessary for democratic development. The EU’s integrative approach, which emphasises Thailand’s alignment with a rules-based international order while supporting social and economic rights, reflects a strategy of engaging in less politically sensitive areas to cultivate a broad societal base for democracy. By working with diverse actors and supporting incremental progress in human rights, trade, and governance, the EU may contribute to long-term democratic resilience – even if structural change remains slow and contested.

 

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This article is part of the Deep Dive “European Responses to Moments of Democratic Opportunity“.

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

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