The democratic and Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Georgian people, long supported by the west, stand at a critical crossroads. Despite decades of engagement by the US and the EU, the nation is sliding into authoritarianism under the Georgian Dream (GD) regime and is facing the potential collapse of its statehood. The article looks at how Georgia has reached this impasse, interweaving internal political challenges with the growing influence of Russia and other authoritarian actors. It also examines why western efforts have thus far failed to bring about meaningful change. Given that Georgia’s fight for democracy holds broader regional and strategic significance, the piece emphasises the urgent need for impactful western action and the institutionalisation of civic resistance to safeguard democracy and restore the nation’s European path.
For over three decades, the Georgian people’s democratic aspirations have driven substantial western support. Despite the engagement of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), Georgia’s democratic progress has repeatedly faltered and is now giving way to entrenched authoritarianism under the Georgian Dream (GD) party. This regression stems from internal political challenges, waning western influence, and the increasing presence of Russia and other authoritarian actors in the region.
As GD tightens its grip on power, external pressure has yet to achieve major political change. While western sanctions have not dismantled the regime, they have strengthened civic mobilisation and bolstered public resolve. To succeed, western pressure must intensify, and inclusive societal demonstrations must evolve into organised, institutionalised opposition capable of sustaining momentum and effectively countering the regime.
A liberal beacon on the brink of collapse
The rise of strongmen and the spread of authoritarian governments have become global trends. This shift is fuelled by the waning international influence of the west and growing alliances among authoritarian states like Russia, China, and Iran, along with their proxies. The grim shadow of authoritarianism is sweeping over some young, once-promising democracies, which, after years of navigating complex western geopolitics, are now losing their way.
Georgia, a small country in the Caucasus once hailed by former US President George W. Bush as a “beacon of liberty”, is among them. Since restoring its independence in 1991, Georgia has followed an inconsistent path towards democratisation: never fully democratised, yet never completely failing. Throughout this period, however, the country’s foreign policy and political outlook have aimed at the west. Successive governments, regardless of their political affiliations or ideologies, have continuously prioritised a pro-western agenda. They have viewed alignment with the west and integration into western institutions as the only viable path to counter the Russian threat and safeguard Georgia’s sovereignty.
In recent years, particularly since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Georgia’s political trajectory has shifted significantly under the de facto rule of Russia-backed oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili and his GD government. What began as a gradual pivot away from the west and democratic principles, seen by some as a shift towards a Hungarian-style hybrid political regime, has escalated into a more overt embrace of authoritarianism. This troubling trend reached a critical juncture in May 2024 with the passage of a controversial law on the transparency of foreign influence aimed at civil society organisations (CSOs) and their predominantly European and American donors.
This move to weaken civil society and restrict western support was accompanied by the introduction of a concerning so-called offshore law that enables the unchecked inflow of offshore assets into the country, essentially allowing Georgia to evade international sanctions. In effect, the government curtailed western development assistance while opening the door to the corrupt wealth of GD founder Ivanishvili and other Russia-linked oligarchs. This move was soon followed by the adoption of additional undemocratic, Russia-inspired legislation to protect so-called family values and restrict LGBTQ rights. These actions have deepened concerns that Georgia’s government is prioritising the interests of its oligarchic ruler and Russia over the nation’s strategic goals and its European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
The alleged rigging of Georgia’s October 2024 parliamentary election dealt a significant blow to the nation’s democratic trajectory by further entrenching GD’s power and reinforcing its alignment with Russian interests. Led by Ivanishvili, who is now officially labelled a Kremlin agent by the US, the ruling party has actively undermined Georgia’s EU integration efforts. Following the formation of a government widely viewed as illegitimate, disputed Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze sparked outrage by announcing that Georgia’s pursuit of EU membership would be suspended until the end of 2028.
The Georgian people, over 80% of whom support European and Euro-Atlantic integration, have taken to the streets of Tbilisi and other cities, feeling deeply betrayed. For over two months of continuous peaceful protests, they have demanded a new election and a recommitment to the country’s European path. In response, the GD government has employed extreme measures of repression, drawing comparisons with Russian-style crackdowns. As documented by CSOs, over 400 peaceful demonstrators have faced brutal violence by police and special forces, with alarming reports of beatings and torture during and after detentions, public chases, and arbitrary arrests by unidentifiable masked men. Representatives of the political opposition and critical media have been deliberately targeted.
These attempts to intimidate protesters and suppress dissent have backfired. The protests have grown in scale and intensity, with hundreds of thousands taking to the streets daily across Georgia, and gained significant international attention, including from US and European leaders. Despite this pressure, the regime remains defiant, pushing forward repressive laws, continuing arrests, and intensifying confrontation and political oppression.
Everything the Georgian state has built since the country declared independence, including what was built with the west’s support, has been undermined by GD rule. Thirty-four years after independence, Georgia faces a collapse of its statehood, with institutions that have been captured by a Russia-backed oligarch, police who have been turned into a violent political instrument used against the people, and a crumbling economy. Georgia’s democracy – and, in the long term, its existence as a free, independent nation – now hinges on two strongholds for survival: the unwavering resistance of its people and intensified support from the west.
The stark political pivot in Georgia is the result of a complex interplay of internal and external factors. Domestically, over a decade of oligarchic rule, coupled with a weak and fragmented political opposition, has eroded democratic institutions, undermined public trust, and, ultimately, led to full-scale state capture. Externally, the west’s declining presence and years of hesitant, inconsistent geopolitical support for Georgia have created a vacuum increasingly filled by growing Russian influence and pressure. In the words of Luke Coffey, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, “Russia wants Georgia in its empire more than the West wants Georgia in its community. Until this changes, the Georgian people will continue to pay the price.”
From democratic decline to authoritarian rule
Throughout the history of the modern Georgian state, a recurring pattern has emerged in its politics: political elites, whether they come to power through an election, a coup d’état, or the overthrow of the incumbent government, often begin their tenure as proponents of democratisation but eventually regress into authoritarian practices. The current political turmoil is yet another iteration of this trend.
GD, which rose to rule as a coalition of political parties through the country’s first peaceful transfer of power via democratic elections, gradually conformed to the Georgian norm: one-party dominance, oligarchic influence, elite corruption, fragile rule of law, weak institutions, and a lack of inclusive political dialogue. These systemic problems not only stalled democratic progress but also deepened political polarisation, laying the groundwork for the authoritarian shift.
The first turning point came with the 2020 parliamentary election, which was widely criticised by opposition parties for alleged electoral fraud. The political crisis escalated when opposition members refused to take their parliamentary seats, accusing the ruling GD party of having manipulated the election results. Efforts to mediate the crisis through an EU-brokered agreement ultimately failed, further entrenching divisions. Since then, the GD government has consolidated its power by leveraging its dominant position to sideline opposition voices and tighten its grip on the political process.
In the face of GD’s consolidation of power, the political opposition has struggled to establish itself as a stable and credible political class. Numerous political parties have emerged only to fade into political irrelevance over time. Some have been discredited and lost public support, others have prioritised personal gain over long-term political engagement, and several have shifted their ideologies to align with the dominant ruling party.
These patterns have left the political landscape fragmented and immature, with opposition parties facing significant societal distrust and alienation. Even those opposition parties that remain visible in today’s political arena find it challenging to convince the electorate of their viability. Salome Zourabichvili, who was replaced as Georgia’s president in December 2024 but is still widely regarded as the legitimate head of state, has attempted to bring opposition parties together and present them as a united front. But the opposition remains divided and unable to consolidate and speak with one voice, even on crucial national matters.
The combination of a weak opposition and a monolithic autocratic ruling party has created an uneven political playing field, where defeating the entrenched power has become exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. Elections have proven incapable of altering this deadlock. As political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way explain, under “competitive authoritarianism”, “elections without democracy” cannot bring decisive change. In recent elections, a paradox emerged: a majority of Georgians, according to independent exit polls, voted for an opposition they often disliked and distrusted, driven by deep frustration with the ruling party. Yet, this bold move failed to alter the political deadlock, as the election results were marred.
The unchecked influence of a Russia-backed oligarch as GD’s founder has dismantled checks and balances, eroding the separation of powers. The legislative, executive, and judicial branches, along with state institutions such as the parliament, the government, the judiciary, the police, and prosecutors, operate under the tight control of GD and, by extension, of Ivanishvili. This centralised power structure thrives on political loyalty and systemic corruption, turning governance into a tool for partisan and personal interests, rather than serving the public.
In Georgia’s political crisis, the opposition and civil society viewed Zourabichvili as the last independent and legitimate institution. Despite her largely symbolic role as president, she embodied democratic resistance by breaking away from GD, which she had initially supported, and criticising its democratic backsliding. However, as her term ended in December 2024, GD installed Mikheil Kavelashvili, a former footballer and a vocal critic of the west, as Georgia’s next president, further consolidating the party’s power and erasing the final independent office in Georgia’s governance.
Notably, the oligarchic grip on power extends beyond state institutions. The Georgian Orthodox Church, which commands significant influence over the population, has become a key ally of the ruling party. The church frequently acts in tandem with GD by leveraging its pulpit to propagate anti-liberal, anti-western ideologies among its vast congregation. This alignment, further amplified by GD-controlled media and well-organised troll factories, seeks to polarise Georgian society, reinforce authoritarian narratives, and undermine progressive, pro-European movements.
This total state capture, driven by a combination of heavy-handed oligarchic rule and systemic corruption, has hollowed out Georgia’s institutional integrity. Governance is conducted not through transparent and accountable mechanisms but through opaque networks designed to sustain the power of the self-proclaimed ruling elite.
The multifaceted influence of Russia and other actors
The lack of robust democratic institutions has created an environment in which governance often depends more on individuals than on stable, transparent systems. This volatility has left Georgia vulnerable to influence from authoritarian-leaning neighbours, predominantly Russia (along with its allies, China and Iran), which remains heavily invested in preserving its influence over the region, particularly in Georgia.
Moscow has always viewed Georgia’s democratisation and alignment with the west as existential threats to its influence in the South Caucasus and the Black Sea. Over the years, Russia has employed a wide array of strategies to destabilise Georgia’s democratic trajectory and impede its Euro-Atlantic integration. These hybrid tactics range from military intervention to economic leverage and a sophisticated disinformation campaign, all designed to erode Georgia’s sovereignty and stall its western aspirations.
This persistent political infiltration has been a significant challenge for all Georgian governments. However, under Ivanishvili, Moscow has strengthened its influence by cultivating ties with Georgian elites, making them increasingly sympathetic to Russian interests. These actors, often entrenched in the political establishment, actively align Tbilisi’s policies with Moscow’s priorities while eroding democratic institutions and public trust in pro-western governance. The Georgian government’s rapprochement with Russia deepened notably after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the resulting international sanctions.
Georgia has abstained from joining these sanctions or strongly condemning Russia’s aggression, despite widespread international calls for solidarity with Ukraine. Moscow has rewarded this stance through incentives such as the resumption of direct flights, the removal of visa requirements for Georgian nationals, and the expansion of trade ties. Russian officials have lauded Georgia’s “constructive” approach, interpreting it as acquiescence to Moscow’s regional dominance.
The war in Ukraine has also triggered a significant influx of Russian citizens and businesses into Georgia. By June 2022, nearly 300,000 Russians had entered the country, though many have since departed. Alongside this migration came increased intelligence penetration, with networks of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) exploiting the situation to target Georgian state institutions, civil society, and media outlets. These efforts aim to manipulate public narratives and acquire sensitive information, further entrenching Russian influence.
Georgia’s growing economic ties with Russia are a double-edged sword. While trade and investment create opportunities, they also increase Georgia’s vulnerability to Russian economic coercion. Bilateral trade has reached unprecedented levels, with Georgian imports from Russia soaring by 79% in 2022. This trend has also made Georgia a hub for Russian oligarchs and businesses evading sanctions. The number of Russian-registered companies in Georgia has reached an all-time high, with over 37,400 firms registered as of mid-2024. More than 30,000 of these were established after the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. These companies operate across critical sectors, such as energy, telecommunications, and gambling, raising concerns about Georgia’s susceptibility to Russian economic levers.
Russia’s continued occupation of Georgia’s territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is another of Moscow’s powerful tools for exerting influence. These occupied territories serve as a constant reminder of Georgia’s unresolved security challenges and as leverage to shape its foreign policy priorities, particularly its efforts to integrate into the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Russia frequently threatens to formalise the annexation of these regions, a move that would significantly destabilise Georgia and deter its western partners. The possibility of renewed military aggression constantly looms over Georgia. GD has been using this implicit threat to curtail the country’s strategic options and reinforce a climate of fear and dependence on Moscow.
Information warfare has been one of the Kremlin’s most effective tools against Georgia’s population. Moscow has intensified its disinformation campaigns by leveraging media outlets and social media platforms to disseminate propaganda. Kremlin-controlled media compete directly with Georgia’s national broadcasters, spreading narratives aimed at undermining the country’s pro-western orientation and deepening societal divisions. This disinformation effort is reinforced by the Georgian Orthodox Church, which, by being closely tied to the Russian Orthodox Church, amplifies Moscow’s anti-liberal and anti-western ideologies. With its significant influence, the church acts as a key instrument of Russian soft power in Georgia.
Alongside Moscow, Beijing is also making important moves towards Tbilisi, increasing its influence in the South Caucasus. The announcement in July 2023 of a strategic partnership agreement between China and Georgia caught many in Georgia and the west by surprise. While Beijing and Tbilisi have enjoyed warm relations, underscored by a free-trade agreement signed in 2017, the timing and scope of this strategic cooperation reflect shifting geopolitical dynamics in the region. The accord highlights China’s ambition to strengthen its position in the South Caucasus, a region marked by instability and growing competition for influence. For Georgia, this move appears to be a calculated attempt to balance relations between the collective west and the east.
A key element of the expanded partnership is the construction of Georgia’s Anaklia port. Positioned on the shortest route from China to Europe, Anaklia is a critical piece of infrastructure in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Notably, this project was originally envisioned to be developed by a consortium of American, British, and Georgian investors, raising questions about the implications of China’s – and thereby Russia’s – growing involvement in such a strategic asset. Notably, a planned Chinese-operated deep-sea port in Anaklia is located just 18 miles (29 kilometres) from a Russian naval base in Ochamchire, within Russia-occupied Abkhazia. Both projects present significant threats to Georgia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and alignment with the west, and to security in the Black Sea.
Tighter ties with Iran are also part of Georgia’s geopolitical pivot. Kobakhidze’s attendance in May 2024 of the funeral of former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi suggests Tbilisi’s intent to strengthen ties with Tehran, reflecting a diminished sensitivity to potential objections from Washington and Brussels. Notably, Iran, alongside Russia, supported GD in its 2024 election campaign. A post-election report by the McCain Institute highlighted claims by Azeri civic organisers that Iranian proxies had funded various local religious and business groups that were spreading anti-western and anti-LGBTQ narratives aligned with GD’s campaign messaging. Sources also indicate that Georgia’s gas imports from Iran surged by over 600% in 2023. If the two countries are indeed deepening their ties, energy supplies are likely to play a central role in this emerging partnership.
While GD claims to pursue pragmatic engagement with Russia and other authoritarian actors, this strategy – or, perhaps, guise – has undermined Georgia’s sovereignty and democratic values while derailing its three-decades-long pursuit of western alliances. Georgia’s dependence on trade and investment from these actors, combined with the influx of their citizens, businesses, and intelligence operatives, has strengthened their influence over the country and further distanced Georgia from its western partners.
The west’s shrinking presence
For over three decades, the US and the EU have shown an ambivalent commitment to Georgia, neither fully abandoning it nor providing tangible pathways such as EU or NATO membership. In the early 1990s, western support for Georgia focused largely on humanitarian aid. Democracy-building programmes began to emerge in the early 2000s and became more instrumentalised in later years, with key frameworks such as the 2009 US-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, the 2014 EU-Georgia Association Agreement, and visa liberalisation.
These efforts concentrated on civil society development, judicial reform, governance transparency, economic growth, military capacity building, and mechanisms of social, economic, and political approximation. They have achieved sectoral successes but lacked sufficient incentives to drive Georgia towards deeper but politically costly reforms.
In terms of fostering democracy, the west’s impact has always been marginal. Western support has often been defined by short-term objectives and inconsistent enforcement and engagement. Aid packages and technical assistance were frequently tied to shifting political conditions, reflecting global changes in western priorities. Consequently, Georgia’s reform initiatives were often left unfinished and failed to embed sustainable, systemic changes capable of withstanding internal or external pressures.
The precariousness of Georgia’s democratic development has been exacerbated in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which vividly highlighted the global contest between autocracy and democracy and the broader threat to the global order. This geopolitical realignment prompted renewed western rhetoric and a focus on countering authoritarian influence, among other measures, through a new wave of NATO enlargement and moves towards further EU expansion.
Despite Georgia’s democratic backsliding and tensions with the EU over the country’s failure to fulfil the reforms required by the European Commission’s 12 priorities, the union granted Georgia candidate country status in December 2023, affirming that the future of the Georgian people lies in the EU. Although the EU’s decision to open the formal accession process was widely welcomed by the Georgian people, civil society, and the political opposition, the announcement inadvertently provided GD with a boost to intensify its autocratic actions.
Instead of committing to the required democratic reforms, Georgia’s political discourse and trajectory took a dramatic turn, which culminated in the passage of the controversial so-called foreign agents law, effectively undermining this historic decision. In response, Washington imposed travel bans on some GD politicians, while Brussels froze Georgia’s progress towards EU membership. However, these actions largely echoed past strategies that had proven ineffective in addressing democratic backsliding and the deeply entrenched influence of authoritarian actors in Georgia and the region.
Georgia’s democratic backsliding is also linked to a broader democracy deficit in the EU and the US. Internal divisions, such as the rise of illiberal governments in Hungary, Slovakia, and the US under President Donald Trump, alongside the growing influence of far-right political forces in Europe, have undermined the west’s credibility. Hybrid regimes like Georgia’s exploit these inconsistencies by questioning the rationale for adhering to western standards when the west itself struggles to uphold them.
The collective inability of western powers to demonstrate internal cohesion has diminished their transformative appeal, particularly in Georgia, where actors like Russia, China, and Iran are strategically expanding their influence. These competitors offer tangible resources and alternative frameworks, which appeal to Georgia’s corrupt political elites, who seek diversified alliances and more favourable partnerships.
After over three decades of engagement, the west now faces a critical juncture in Georgia. Both values-based dialogue and conditional policies have lost their effectiveness in influencing a government that has increasingly veered towards authoritarian practices and now wields power in a contested, illegitimate manner. Without a fundamental reassessment of its approach, the west risks losing what remains of its influence in Georgia, further diminishing the prospects for democracy in the region.
Civic resistance and western support: pillars of democratic resilience
The west’s most significant achievement in Georgia has been to nurture the strong, pro-western sentiment of its people. The greatest obstacle to successive governments’ anti-liberal, anti-EU policies – and a key deterrent to new authoritarian actors – has been Georgia’s resilient population.
Georgians stand apart from other post-Soviet societies in their fierce commitment to freedom, shaped by centuries of resistance to Russian oppression. Even 70 years of Soviet occupation failed to quash their spirit. This determination continues today and is manifested in the streets of Tbilisi and other cities, particularly among the younger generation.
For Georgia’s Gen Z, there is no nostalgia for Russia – its culture, its corrupt systems, its oligarchic rule, or even its language. Young Georgians see their identity firmly rooted in Europe. For them, the struggle is not just political but existential: a battle for Georgia’s freedom, sovereignty, and European future. They are willing to make personal sacrifices, driven by the belief that dignity and freedom are worth more than life itself. This unyielding resolve has not been broken by violent crackdowns on protesters; it has only grown stronger.
In Georgia, successive political crises, including the current turmoil, have seen pluralist values and democratic resilience deepen amid autocratisation – a pattern that analysts Elene Panchulidze and Richard Youngs have termed “cyclical resilience”. However, containing these autocratic advances remains challenging. Societal resistance to the GD regime is growing, but it has yet to reverse autocratisation.
A critical weakness in Georgia’s democratic resilience is the lack of institutionalisation in protests. While inclusive societal demonstrations are vital, they must transition into organised, institutionalised opposition to sustain their impact and counter the regime’s autocratic actions effectively. If opposition political actors fail to capitalise on this wave of civil protest in time, the window of opportunity might progressively close under mounting regime pressure.
Furthermore, the west must seize this momentum and empower the Georgian people in their fight for democracy. Past neglect has shown the risks of complacency. The west largely overlooked Russia’s occupation of Georgian territories after the 2008 war, emboldening Moscow and setting a dangerous precedent that culminated in the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Today, the stakes in Georgia are clear. This is not merely about one oligarch’s actions; it is part of Russia’s broader imperialist strategy to reassert dominance over its former sphere of influence. Supporting Georgia is not only a geopolitical necessity but also a moral imperative. Georgia’s strategic location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia highlights its importance to western interests. The country’s pipelines bolster Europe’s energy security, while its Black Sea ports, particularly Anaklia, have the potential to transform regional trade and security. By supporting Georgia, the west also strengthens its own credibility in the global contest between authoritarianism and democratic values.
The GD regime, backed by Russia and other authoritarian actors, openly attacks western allies, dismissing them as a “global war party” and targeting US and EU representatives who support the Georgian people. These actions demand a strong, principled response. While Washington and Brussels have imposed visa restrictions on some GD representatives and suspended government assistance, these measures lacked the force needed to enact meaningful change.
Coordinated sanctions by the US and the UK to target officials in Georgia’s interior ministry were followed by another bold move by Washington to extend financial sanctions on Ivanishvili for “undermining the democratic and Euro-Atlantic future of Georgia for [Russia’s] benefit”. These were steps in the right direction but not enough.
While recent sanctions and the anticipation of additional stringent measures, such as the proposed US MEGOBARI Act and Georgian Nightmare Non-Recognition Act, have not yet dismantled the regime, they have bolstered civic mobilisation and reinforced public resolve – Georgia’s last bastions of democratic resilience. To ensure that Georgia’s fight for democracy and European aspirations remain strong, the US, the EU, and the UK must intensify their coordinated pressure on Ivanishvili, his family, businesses that sustain his regime, and key members of his political team.
The stakes for Georgia extend far beyond its borders. As retired US Army officer Ben Hodges has observed, Georgia is not an island but a vital gateway between Europe and Asia. A robust western strategy for the greater Black Sea region, encompassing Georgia alongside Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine, is essential.
The west’s comprehensive response to Georgia’s crisis will not only shape this resilient nation’s future but also define that of the South Caucasus and the credibility of the US and the EU as defenders of democracies. Supporting Georgia is therefore a strategic imperative and a litmus test of the west’s commitment to the region as well as to democracy, freedom, and human dignity in the face of rising global authoritarianism.
Author
Tamar Khuntsaria is an associate professor at the University of Georgia and a former strategic communication lead for EU programmes in Georgia. With over two decades of professional experience, she has held senior roles in international and non-governmental organisations, leading initiatives in democratic reform, economic development, and strategic communications. Her academic expertise focuses on qualitative research design and international politics, with a particular emphasis on EU foreign policy and democracy promotion in Eastern Europe, particularly Georgia. Tamar holds a PhD in International Relations from Tbilisi State University, an MSc in Politics from the University of Edinburgh, and an MPA from Bowling Green State University. She has received prestigious academic honours, including the UK Government’s Chevening Scholarship, the U.S. Department of State’s Edmund S. Muskie Graduate Fellowship, and fellowships from the Open Society Institute and the Erasmus+ Jean Monnet program.
This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
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