Montenegro: Between Democratic Renewal and Geopolitical Priorities

Ever since Montenegro gained its independence in 2006, the country has aspired to join the European Union (EU), formally becoming a candidate for membership in 2010. The EU accession process was expected to be a transformative driver that would strengthen Montenegro’s democracy, advance the rule of law, and curb corruption. Yet, during three decades of uninterrupted rule by the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), the country’s democracy steadily weakened. While the EU accession process moved forwards on paper, it failed to drive the substantive democratic reforms needed to dismantle entrenched power structures.

Montenegro’s 2020 parliamentary election marked a critical democratic breakthrough. The DPS lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since the 1990s, leading to the formation of a new government. The international community, including the EU, welcomed this political transition. Viewing it as an opportunity to reset the country’s reform trajectory, the EU supported Montenegro’s new government and carefully avoided public criticism of the fragile coalition.

This cautious approach was later shaped by geopolitical factors, particularly after Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. By 2023, the EU’s strategy increasingly prioritised Montenegro’s accelerated accession over a merit-based assessment of democratic progress. While this approach has shown a clear EU commitment to regional stability, it has raised concerns that the urgency of responding to shifting geopolitical dynamics and security imperatives may come at the expense of deeper and more sustainable democratic reforms. The EU’s strategy, while pragmatic, risks reinforcing superficial compliance while neglecting genuine institutional transformation.

Montenegro’s democratic opening

Montenegro’s political trajectory leading up to the 2020 parliamentary election was shaped by three decades of rule by the DPS, led by Milo Đukanović. This period was characterised by a decline in democratic governance, marked by state capture, weakened institutions, and endemic corruption. The DPS blurred the boundaries between state and party, leveraging systemic corruption, patronage networks, and undue influence over institutions to maintain its grip on power. Judicial independence was weak, media freedom was stifled, and the opposition faced significant institutional disadvantages.

Reports by Freedom House and Transparency International consistently rated Montenegro “partly free”, with declining scores for political pluralism, governance, and the rule of law. Despite the country’s democratic backsliding, the DPS continued to advance Montenegro’s EU accession process, and all 33 negotiation chapters had been opened by 2020. However, this progress masked deeper, systemic issues that plagued Montenegro’s institutions.

The conditions that led to the 2020 election were formed by growing public dissatisfaction with stagnating reforms and a lack of accountability. Corruption scandals, judicial inefficiency, and the politicisation of state institutions further fuelled the electorate’s frustration. International observers, including the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, assessed the election as competitive and transparent though marred by an uneven playing field because of the ruling party’s misuse of state resources and its media dominance.

The election marked a historic democratic opening that ended the DPS’s decades-long rule. With a notably high voter turnout of 76.6%, the election reflected the population’s demand for change. Three coalitions – For the Future of Montenegro, Peace Is Our Nation, and the civic movement United Reform Action (URA) – joined forces to form a new government. Despite its ideological diversity, the governing coalition was united by a shared goal: dismantling the entrenched patronage networks and systemic corruption. URA, led by Dritan Abazović, played a decisive role in securing the government’s parliamentary majority of just four seats. As an advocate of EU integration and anti-corruption, Abazović positioned URA as a key reformist force.

The new government’s challenges and fragility

Despite its early progress, the new government quickly encountered significant obstacles. The administration’s ideological fragmentation, combined with its slim parliamentary majority, created an environment of political instability. Internal disagreements over policy priorities and governance strategies undermined Podgorica’s ability to implement comprehensive reforms. While the government’s reliance on technocrats was initially praised for bringing expertise to governance, it also drew criticism for its detachment from traditional political processes and its limited ability to navigate Montenegro’s polarised political environment.

Deeply entrenched state-capture networks posed another critical challenge. Efforts to dismantle these networks were met with resistance, further complicating the government’s reform agenda. Judicial reform, a cornerstone of the government’s anti-corruption strategy, was hindered by personnel shortages, political interference, and institutional inefficiency.

Political polarisation also intensified, as opposition factions and entrenched interests sought to exploit the coalition’s vulnerabilities. This turbulence culminated in the government’s collapse in early 2022, highlighting the fragility of Montenegro’s democratic progress. The subsequent formation of a minority government, led by Abazović with the backing of the DPS, drew sharp criticism from domestic political actors, segments of civil society, and political analysts, and underscored the challenges of maintaining reform momentum in a divided political landscape.

The EU’s response to Montenegro’s democratic turnaround

The international community, including the EU, welcomed Montenegro’s 2020 democratic breakthrough as an important signal for the country’s future. The EU expressed strong support for the new government’s reformist aspirations and viewed this moment as a critical opportunity to advance Montenegro’s EU accession process.

Yet, the challenges encountered by Montenegro’s 2020–22 government not only tested the resilience of the country’s democratic institutions but also revealed the limits of the EU’s capacity to respond effectively. The union’s approach to Montenegro’s democratic opening reflected a broader tension between maintaining stability and fostering meaningful reform.

The EU’s response was measured but cautious. Recognising the potential for reform, the EU provided strong rhetorical support for the new government and signalled its readiness to engage. This initial optimism was evident in statements that welcomed the peaceful transfer of power and emphasised the importance of maintaining Montenegro’s EU integration trajectory.

Before 2020, the EU’s engagement with Montenegro had been largely accommodating, driven by shifting political priorities in the EU and a growing preference for stability over stringent conditionality. Despite consistently stressing judicial reform, media freedom, and anti-corruption measures, the union had been reluctant to enforce conditionality and apply stronger pressure on entrenched elites. This hesitation had allowed systemic state capture to flourish under the DPS.

Notable scholars, such as Jelena Džankić, Soeren Keil, Marko Kmezić, and Florian Bieber, have argued that the EU’s focus on stability and superficial compliance, for instance by opening negotiation chapters, often undermined deeper democratic reforms. Solveig Richter and Natasha Wunsch have highlighted that lenient conditionality and the EU’s reliance on elite-driven reforms allowed elites to manipulate the process, creating an environment in which symbolic compliance substituted for genuine democratisation. By the time of the 2020 election, years of tolerating superficial compliance had diminished the EU’s leverage over Montenegro’s democratic transition. This weakness was compounded by a broader decline in the EU’s influence across the western Balkans.

While the 2020 election marked a historic democratic opening, it also underscored the lasting impact of the EU’s failure to enforce its conditionality framework more rigorously. After 2020, the EU maintained a cautious approach and continued to prioritise stability over deeper political change.

Geopolitical considerations, particularly after Russia’s aggression in Ukraine from 2022 onwards, further shaped the EU’s response. The urgency to accelerate Montenegro’s accession process became a strategic priority driven by the need to stabilise the western Balkans amid growing external pressures. While this shift reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to regional integration, it also raised concerns that security-driven pragmatism could weaken the enforcement of democratic reforms. Political scientist Frank Schimmelfennig has highlighted this dilemma, noting that the EU’s focus on geopolitical stability has loosened conditionality and accelerated accession processes while risking delays in meaningful transformation.

The nature and limitations of EU support

The EU’s engagement with Montenegro after 2020 was characterised by increased financial and technical support, reflecting the union’s commitment to democratic consolidation and rule-of-law reforms. Since 2007, the EU has provided approximately €1.2 billion in grants to Montenegro, including over €135 million under the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) III for 2021–23. Additional mechanisms, such as the €6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans for 2024–27, introduced stronger conditionality by linking financial support to concrete reforms.

This funding targeted areas including judicial reform, anti-corruption, and capacity building in public institutions. Notable EU-funded projects comprised EUROL I and II, which supported police and judicial reforms, and the IPA Civil Society Facility, which aimed to enhance transparency and democratic governance. However, as interviews and reports have highlighted, the scale and scope of these initiatives were often insufficient to address entrenched issues, such as politicised judicial appointments and weak institutional accountability.

A 2022 report by the European Court of Auditors emphasised key limitations of EU assistance across the western Balkans. While funding contributed to operational improvements, its overall impact remained weak because of domestic resistance to reform, a lack of local ownership, and insufficient monitoring mechanisms. The report also criticised weak enforcement of political conditionality, noting that the EU rarely restricted funding when reforms stalled.

Beyond financial aid, the EU sought to support Montenegro’s reform trajectory diplomatically with statements that urged alignment with EU governance standards. However, while the union’s financial assistance signalled strong engagement, its diplomatic approach remained cautious and often prioritised political stability over substantive change.

By December 2024, Montenegro had provisionally closed the three negotiation chapters on intellectual property law, information society and the media, and enterprise and industrial policy. However, these milestones underscored the ongoing tension between accelerating accession talks and ensuring meaningful democratic reforms.

The EU’s reluctance to confront political breaches further undermined its credibility. While this restraint was driven partly by the aim of expediting Montenegro’s accession, it also reflected a broader hesitation to publicly challenge a fragile government that had emerged from a historic democratic breakthrough. Acknowledging the significance of the country’s first peaceful transfer of power, the EU appeared cautious about exerting excessive pressure that could destabilise the coalition or be perceived as discouraging reformist efforts. Yet, this approach risked signalling that political alignment with the EU – rather than deep institutional reforms – was sufficient to sustain Montenegro’s European path.

For instance, while Montenegro made notable progress on media freedom, concerns remained over political influence in public broadcasting. Despite repeated court rulings against the politically motivated reappointment of the director of Montenegro’s public broadcaster, RTCG, the European Commission’s 2024 enlargement report for the country did not explicitly address the controversy. The commission’s rule-of-law report acknowledged the case but stopped short of calling for corrective action. While the EU welcomed broader improvements in the media landscape, its decision to downplay unresolved governance challenges in public broadcasting reflected its broader balancing act – between reinforcing democratic gains and avoiding criticism that could weaken a new government.

Similarly, many civil society groups, analysts, and political commentators criticised the EU for failing to proactively support long-term democratic consolidation. Montenegro’s accelerated accession process, while politically expedient, has already contributed to the institutionalisation of weak governance, rather than fostering structural democratic transformation.

As Schimmelfennig has argued, EU enlargement without irreversible achievements in the rule of law leads to superficial compliance instead of substantive reform. This pattern is already evident in other western Balkan countries and Turkey. Džankić, similarly, has noted that by focusing on the enlargement process itself rather than on the depth and quality of reforms, the EU has weakened its transformative leverage.

Comparison with the US response

Compared with the EU, the United States (US) has taken more targeted measures, such as sanctions and public diplomacy, to address corruption and governance challenges. For instance, in April 2022, the US Treasury sanctioned Svetozar Marović, a former deputy president of the DPS, for his involvement in corruption related to construction projects. Similar sanctions in 2023 and 2024 targeted individuals and entities accused of threatening democratic governance and regional stability.

These sanctions, combined with US support for investigative journalism and whistle-blowers as well as legal mechanisms that incentivise the reporting of Balkans-related sanctions violations, reflect a more immediate and punitive approach to addressing corruption. The US has relied primarily on direct interventions against specific actors, aiming to deter malign activities through financial and legal consequences.

By contrast, the EU’s structured and institutional approach emphasises political conditionality, financial assistance, and governance reforms. While this method seeks to promote long-term resilience through systemic change, it has faced criticism for lacking strong enforcement mechanisms and allowing protracted compliance rather than immediate accountability. The EU’s reliance on gradual reforms and negotiated political processes means that its impact is often slower and more dependent on domestic political will.

Both approaches have their strengths and limitations. While the US employs targeted sanctions as a deterrent, the EU’s method of capacity building and conditionality aims for sustainable institutional transformation. However, challenges remain: the effectiveness of US sanctions depends on domestic enforcement, while the EU’s long-term engagement risks being undermined by political inertia and weak implementation. Rather than viewing one approach as inherently superior, one should see these distinct strategies as highlighting the complexity of addressing corruption and democratic backsliding in the western Balkans.

Conclusion

Montenegro’s 2020 parliamentary election represented a rare democratic opening in a region where autocratic tendencies often prevail. The peaceful transfer of power offered an opportunity to reset the country’s governance trajectory, dismantle entrenched networks of state capture, and realign with democratic principles. However, the fragile coalition government and the country’s deeply polarised political landscape underscored the challenges of sustaining reform momentum.

The EU’s response to this moment of opportunity was both vital and limited. While the union’s financial assistance, democracy-support projects, and rhetorical backing signalled a strong commitment to Montenegro’s EU integration, its emphasis on accelerating accession often came at the expense of deeper institutional reforms. By prioritising regional stability and political alignment, the EU often settled for procedural compliance over substantive change.

Comparisons with the US highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the EU’s approach. While the EU offered long-term capacity-building and accession frameworks, the US relied on direct and forceful interventions, such as sanctions, to confront entrenched corruption and state capture. These differing strategies reveal the complexities of supporting democratic transitions in fragile contexts.

Montenegro’s experience underscores the broader challenges facing external actors in fostering democratic resilience in post-authoritarian settings. The EU’s reliance on elite-driven reforms and nominal compliance has often limited its ability to pre-empt democratic backsliding. To truly support democratic consolidation, the EU must adopt a more strategic and pre-emptive approach that prioritises civil society engagement, institutional resilience, and meaningful political accountability.

As a front-runner in the EU enlargement process, Montenegro is on a trajectory that carries lessons for the broader western Balkans. Montenegro’s democratic transition is more than a national test: it is a barometer for the EU’s credibility as a democratic actor in the region. Whether the EU upholds meaningful reform or settles for superficial compliance will not only shape Montenegro’s future but also determine the integrity of the EU enlargement process itself.

 

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This article is part of the Deep Dive “European Responses to Moments of Democratic Opportunity“.

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

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