The renewed momentum for Ukraine’s EU integration comes at a difficult juncture. Despite major progress since 2014, democratic reforms have stalled, raising two key issues in the path forward. Ukraine is losing its main source of external pressure for reform as Hungary continues to veto the opening of formal accession negotiations. At the same time, the corruption narrative dominates public debate, overshadowing other reforms that are equally deserving of attention. Even under a prolonged accession freeze, Ukraine must internalise reforms to ensure their durability and strengthen long-term security and democratic resilience.
On 10–11 December, Lviv hosted an informal summit of European Affairs ministers, signalling political support for Ukraine and reaffirming its European aspirations despite Hungary’s continued opposition to Ukraine’s EU accession. This display of solidarity comes at a difficult juncture. Ukraine is struggling to navigate an increasingly challenging peace process, stalled reforms, and concerns over President Zelensky’s centralisation of power and the dismissal of key allies from the government, factors which complicate its bid for EU membership. Should President Trump impose unfavourable terms for a peace settlement, the momentum for reform could weaken further. Whether Ukraine can sustain and internalise reforms without external pressure remains an open question: although Kyiv is adopting reforms, their durability in the face of a prolonged freeze on the EU accession process has yet to be tested.
Balancing geopolitical urgency and merit-based accession
This new momentum in EU enlargement poses a key challenge for the Union and countries aspiring to membership: how to balance geopolitical urgency with the merit-based accession process, ensuring that prospective members have strong institutional frameworks and democratic practices.
EU membership should not be a reward for geopolitical alignment alone, even if this is a key driver for both sides. Moreover, with regard to Ukraine, the common argument that accession is central to its security is misguided. For its medium- and long-term security, the country needs robust and broad guarantees, which will be provided by other arrangements. What enlargement can provide instead is impactful reforms and strong institutions. This is where the EU and Ukraine should focus their efforts so as not to compromise the transformative nature of the process.
Ukraine has completed one of the technical accession steps: screening its legislation against EU law and adopting action plans for alignment with the EU acquis – in a record 15 months. However, in line with the assessment of Ukrainian civil society organisations (CSOs), the European Commission’s 2025 enlargement report states that there is, at best, stagnation on key democratic reforms. Ukraine has not made progress in the “fundamentals” cluster of negotiation chapters since the previous reporting period. Opening negotiations on the chapters might be the best way to address those shortcomings through the reform process linked to EU accession.
There are two issues to be considered:
- Ukraine’s ability to internalise democratic reforms without external pressure.
- The focus on, and narratives about, the fight against corruption, despite the fact that other reforms, such as public administration reform, the role of parliament, or reforming the corporate governance structures of state-owned enterprises, are equally deserving of attention.
Internalising democratic reforms without external pressure
Joining the EU requires deep, sustainable institutional reforms. There is a question as to whether Ukraine can internalise such reforms, making them part of its political culture, without external pressure. Another crucial question is whether, if Hungary continues to veto the opening of negotiations in the European Council, the EU has enough leverage to keep Ukraine’s state actors committed to the reform process. The willingness and ability of those in state institutions to pursue the reform agenda will indicate the degree to which Ukraine has internalised reforms. In recent discussions with the author, civil society interlocutors stated that there is no motivation or pressure to adopt legislation without the prospect of progress in the accession process.
The lessons from the 2004 EU enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe, and the subsequent slowdown with regard to democratic norms and practices, and in some cases backsliding, make these concerns even more pertinent.
There is a broad understanding among Ukrainian CSOs that the progress made in anti-corruption reforms since 2014 would not have been possible without the triple conditionality of ratification of the Association Agreement with the EU, the granting of visa-free travel in the Schengen area, and the conditions attached to macro-financial assistance from the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At the time, this conditionality was reinforced by a United States (US) that was committed to advancing reforms in Ukraine. Today, however, there is broad consensus among CSOs that the US withdrawal of financial support and waning political engagement will require the EU to apply conditionality more decisively.
The EU’s traditional “good cop” role, in contrast to the more upfront conditionality of the IMF and the United States, has been changing. The Ukraine Facility is one example of how the EU’s conditionality, outside the enlargement framework, can help maintain the reform momentum. It sets clear benchmarks for the specific reforms the government must undertake before funds are disbursed, as detailed in the Ukraine Plan. In line with this approach, the EU has already withheld €600 million in facility funds due to the lack of reforms at Ukraine’s Asset Recovery and Management Agency.
Ukraine’s accession path is currently obstructed by Hungary’s veto in the European Council, and it is unclear whether a change of government in Budapest following the 2026 elections will change this. Meanwhile, Ukraine will require external pressure to maintain reforms in key areas. As noted, without opening the negotiations, there is very little motivation to move forward on reforms. The only other way to maintain momentum is for the EU to utilise the conditionality in its Ukraine Facility and macro-financial assistance.
Ukraine’s budget is largely dependent on external support. The IMF estimates that the country will need $65 billion in external assistance by the end of 2027, in addition to in-kind military support. The EU, its member states, and the other members of the “coalition of the willing” are the only major partners remaining to support Ukraine financially and to keep it afloat over the next two years both economically and militarily. Stable EU financial assistance has been a necessary condition for Ukraine to receive IMF loans and will remain so. But the EU must strike a delicate balance between providing predictable financial support and embedding conditionality for democratic reforms in its assistance.
Focusing beyond corruption
Ukraine has made considerable progress in establishing anti-corruption institutions in extraordinarily challenging times. However, this progress needs to be consolidated and built upon at a time when the war is placing significant strains on the country, including on human capacity in state institutions.
The adoption in July of laws limiting the independence of key anti-corruption bodies, which were promptly reversed due to domestic and international pressure, cast a shadow over a decade of progress in this area. At the time of writing, the country is consumed by a major scandal in the energy sector involving alleged corruption totalling $100 million. These events underline the importance of Ukraine’s anti-corruption bodies. It is incumbent upon the prosecution service to demonstrate equal determination by establishing the facts and ensuring accountability.
These developments have solidified the perception that Ukrainian society is fighting on two fronts: the war against Russia’s invasion and the battle to maintain the integrity of institutions, democracy, and the rule of law. In fact, there is a third front: the narrative about corruption.
The debate around corruption in Ukraine is not just a governance issue; it is a vulnerability exploited by its adversaries to undermine public trust, institutions, and resilience. Western media have repeatedly picked up the issue since Russia launched its military aggression in 2014. However, reforms implemented over the past decade, with the involvement of CSOs and the private sector and as part of the social contract, have marked a fundamental shift.
Despite the progress made, the perception of Ukraine as “the most corrupt country in Europe” remains prevalent and is used “to promote a recurring pro-Kremlin disinformation narrative.” This perception is inaccurate and harmful. It lacks nuance regarding both the state of affairs since the Euromaidan and the transparency of institutions and civil society. Anti-corruption protests and high-profile investigations conducted by anti-corruption bodies are signs not of endemic failure but of accountability.
Corruption is present in all countries, including within the EU; the decisive factors in combatting corruption are strong institutions and political will. Article 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union designates corruption as a “euro-crime”: recognising it as a particularly grave offence with a cross-border dimension. In recent years, the United Kingdom and the previous US administration placed heightened emphasis on fighting corruption and illicit finance. Earlier this month, the EU institutions reached an agreement on the first EU-wide criminal law specifically targeting corruption. The scale of the challenge is considerable: 2023 estimates suggest that corruption costs the EU between €179 billion and €990 billion annually, accounting for up to 6% of EU GDP. In response, the EU has developed a broad range of legislative and policy initiatives to combat corruption.
Corruption poses a serious risk to national security, undermines public trust in government and institutions, and erodes the rule of law. Addressing this challenge in Ukraine requires elevating anti-corruption efforts through a more comprehensive whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, recognising corruption as a multifaceted problem that demands both robust enforcement and sustained public engagement. While the fight against corruption will remain a central pillar of Ukraine’s reform agenda, reforms in three additional areas that are essential for democratic consolidation warrant equal attention: public administration reform, the strengthening of parliamentary oversight, and the reform of corporate governance structures.
Ukraine performed strongly on public administration reform in the 2025 enlargement report. Sustaining this progress and attracting talent into public service, however, will require an earmarked budget to support salaries, alongside reforms to recruitment and selection processes. Building a professional and depoliticised public administration is essential to Ukraine’s capacity to pursue its overall reform agenda and to ensure that allegations of corruption are effectively investigated. In particular, the police and other law-enforcement agencies, the prosecution service, and the judiciary must serve as the institutional bedrock of democratic reforms.
Operating under martial law imposes constraints on Ukraine’s parliament regarding access to its work and transparency. It limits the parliament’s oversight function, while last-minute votes and poorly informed voting pose a fundamental challenge to the functioning of this vital democratic institution. Many points and recommendations in the report and roadmap produced by the needs-assessment mission of the European Parliament in 2016 remain relevant today.
Given the ongoing wartime uncertainty about when new elections can be held, Ukraine’s European allies should support workable immediate solutions for the parliament, notably when it comes to improving parliamentary oversight, ensuring that parliamentary committees function to the highest standards, and making sure that the voting on key legislation is properly planned and well informed. European and member-state parliaments have a vital role to play. This could include friendship groups as well as strong messages of support, emphasising the importance of the role of parliament.
The latest corruption scandal has brought attention back to the importance of reforming the supervisory boards of state-owned enterprises. In November, Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko called on EU member states to nominate candidates for the supervisory board of the nuclear energy company Energoatom, and she committed the government to auditing and renewing the supervisory boards of state-owned energy enterprises with the help of international auditors. She told the EU’s Political and Security Committee that there would not be a “one-off measure but a comprehensive set of steps to renew the management of the entire system – Naftogaz, Ukrhydroenergo, the Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine, Centrenergo, and Ukrenergo,” emphasising that preventing corruption was a matter of national security and a crucial step on Ukraine’s path to EU accession.
Path forward?
Ukraine must sustain its reform process, irrespective of whether vetoes in the European Council are lifted in the near term. In cooperation with the IMF, the EU should strategically deploy financial assistance to advance reforms, ensuring that substantial progress is made by the time accession negotiations are opened, while also supporting reform momentum across society as a whole. This leveraging of financial assistance will also need to be carefully balanced against Ukraine’s acute economic and other needs, which remain heavily dependent on external assistance, particularly from the EU.
Moreover, although corruption dominates the public debate, equal attention must be devoted to other pillars of the broader democratic agenda. In public administration, a central challenge will be attracting and retaining talent. When it comes to the parliament, sustained support is essential to enable the legislature to fulfil its role effectively, especially as the pace of adoption of legislation to align with EU law accelerates.
Author
Tinatin Tsertsvadze is an Advocacy Advisor at the Open Society Foundations. She is responsible for EU sanctions policies, and also has thematic expertise in human rights, civil society space, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Prior to joining Open Society, she worked for the International Partnership for Human Rights, focusing on Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia as an Advocacy Director and Gender Adviser for five years. She worked at FRIDE, between 2010 – 2014, as Central Asia programme manager and conducted research and advocacy on EU policies towards Central Asia and the South Caucasus. She co-managed a 50-member network of Brussels-based HRDN network between 2016-2019. Prior to that Tinatin worked for the European Socialist Party, assisting in the 2009 European Parliament Election campaign. She also served one year as the Brussels director for European Institutions at AEGEE. She has a master’s degree in public administration (specialising in European Studies) from the Georgian University.
This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
Photo credit: © European Union, 2025
