What Does the ‘Year of Elections’ Tell Us About Democracy?

Introduction

The year 2024 was widely regarded as a pivotal 12 months for democratic governance, with over 80 countries casting ballots across the world.

In many countries, there were no surprises as authoritarian strongmen once again secured overwhelming victories in hollow, ritualistic elections. In recent years, the type of sham elections seen in Russia, Rwanda and Azerbaijan have become more common as power becomes more centralised and political competition is restricted. And the tactics used by autocratic forces have come full circle in the face of democrats seeking to counter attempts to manipulate elections. Egregious cases of vote buying and ballot stuffing seem from a less technically sophisticated age but proved just as salient in 2024 as the examples from Moldova and Georgia aptly demonstrate.

Election results in Senegal, Sri Lanka, Botswana and South Africa opened the door to moments of democratic opportunity with changes to governing parties and coalitions. But even with some positive surprises, many political systems are riven by deepening polarisation, rising populist tactics and strong exclusionary dynamics that put democratic politics under severe pressure. The demand for change continues to topple democratic incumbents, while authoritarian incumbents do not give citizens a fair chance to vote for change at all.

Yet, citizens continue to push back. In Bangladesh, Georgia and Venezuela protestors rallied for political freedoms in the face of government oppression. In different continents, powerful societal resistance signalled a clear demand for change regardless of authoritarian pressure. Some of these movements are successful and others are not, echoing the continuous push and pull between pro-democratic forces and authoritarians.

Elections in the United States and in Europe showed the appeal of far-right messaging, hyper-aggressive campaigning techniques and underscored the importance of issues like the cost-of-living and migration. Most disturbingly for democrats, they also point towards less robust support for the guardrails of the democratic system in the face of demands for real policy change. Both sets of elections were important in themselves but will also have an outsized impact on the shape of international support for democracy in the coming years.

International election observation missions and citizen observers played a crucial role in monitoring electoral processes, identifying irregularities before, during, and after election day. However, despite evidence of these irregularities, they have been limited in their ability to challenge the anti-democratic actions of leaders like those in Georgia, Mozambique and Venezuela who dig their heels in and use lethal force to quash dissent. This could become a new battleground if the international response to such behaviour becomes less robust due to a dwindling number of states willing to take bold action in support of human rights, rule of law and democracy.

Given all this, we asked experts on democracy to reflect on the pivotal year of elections and its impact on democratic politics.

 

2024 US elections: a test of democracy

Americans turned out to vote on November 5 in elections that overall were not only well managed, but also delivered a clear and indisputable result. The motivation to vote was high, with about 65% participation, slightly lower than in 2020, but higher than in any other presidential election since 1960. Fears of litigation and violence, after the elections more than on polling day, proved unfounded – in good part as a result of the voting outcome.

It has become commonplace to claim that election results were determined by immigration and the economy. Even though immigration figures have dropped significantly, Republicans still effectively exploited the Biden administration’s perceived failure to control illegal migration. Moreover, an impressive post-Covid recovery could not outweigh concerns over inflation and declining purchasing power.

While this is true, the overall picture is more complex both in terms of issues and the behaviour of American voters. Immigration and the economy, as well as the sense of insecurity and precarity they generated, were certainly the most prominent campaign themes. However, there were others – abortion, for example – which, though favourable to the Democrats, might ultimately have played in Donald Trump’s favour: by triggering referenda in ten states, including a number of swing states, voters could, and mostly did, overwhelmingly support abortion rights, only then to feel free to vote for Trump in the presidential race.

In Arizona, a southern border state where immigration was a top issue, voters handed the presidency to Trump, but favoured a Latino immigrant Democrat over the MAGA Republican candidate for the Senate open seat. At the same time, in Arizona, Florida and many other states, the old assumption that African Americans, Latinos and other immigrant groups would overwhelmingly vote Democrat proved wrong, with increased participation frequently instead benefitting Republican candidates.

As with many other countries in the 2024 elections super-cycle, voting in America also reflected a strong anti-incumbent and anti-establishment bias amongst the electorate. In the US case, a further element which arguably played against the Democrats was an ‘anti-woke’ reaction against political correctness. This should not necessarily be seen as a rebuttal of all progressive speech tenets, but rather as a rejection of the way this agenda was handled by the liberal establishment, in being perceived as talking down to people rather than engaging with them.

The US electoral system is extraordinarily complex. The legal framework and management of elections are largely individual states’ responsibilities. The multiplication of offices and issues put to the vote, from the President to the local school boards, means that voters are often faced with the daunting prospect of a very long and detailed ballot. In most states, electoral authorities make an admirable effort to motivate the electorate through detailed voter information and the facilitation of early voting, far more than in most other democracies. Equally, the mobilisation of volunteer electoral workers and campaigners far exceeds other countries’ efforts.

This, together with the media outreach, is of course extremely expensive. State and local elections aside, the cost of the 2024 presidential and congressional campaigns has been estimated at nearly USD 16 billion. Americans are notoriously generous contributors, even with small amounts from individual donors, but the better part of these funds comes from large corporations or (very) rich individuals, often through so-called PACs (Political Action Committees) and Super-PACs. With the benevolent indulgence of the Supreme Court, such donations can circumvent campaign finance and reporting rules. The latest addition to these practices was Elon Musk’s USD 1 million-a-day handouts to voters who signed up to support Trump. Surprisingly, this approach, which looks remarkably like a mix of lottery and vote-buying, was cleared by a district judge in a ruling which would be hard to imagine in any European democracy.

Following the federal government’s invitation, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organisation of American States (OAS) both sent significant missions to observe the US elections. However, since elections are subject to widely varying state-level regulations, these observers met with full welcomes and cooperation in some states to absolute refusals to engage in others. Even federal monitors from the Department of Justice were barred by three of the 27 states to which they were sent. This raises serious questions about America’s commitment, at federal and state level, to fundamental principles of access and transparency in electoral processes.

The US has often stood out as an example of dynamic democratic practice. It still does, as witnessed by the admirable engagement of election officials, volunteer poll workers and grassroots activists. However, it also leads in innovation, be it hyper-aggressive campaigning techniques, the use of litigation to ‘stack the cards’, or the increasingly free-for-all campaign finance rules. All these practices could well be picked up by parties and candidates in Europe and elsewhere in the years ahead. Let us hope that election administrators find inspiration in the broad popular engagement and heed the impact of other, less benign innovations.

 

Beyond the relief: unpacking the 2024 European elections

The collective sigh of relief in Brussels corridors after the July European elections was palpable. First and foremost, this happened because the pro-European majority of centre-right EPP, socialist S&D, and liberal RENEW had managed to maintain that majority, with 401 MEPs, albeit with a reduced number of seats. The election by the Parliament of Ursula von der Leyen for a second term confirmed that majority (even if it was the additional Green votes that took her over the line). It also restored the principle (ignored five years ago) that the lead candidate of the largest group should become the Commission’s new President.

Secondly, the overall turnout of 50.7% was almost identical to that of five years ago, when turnout had risen for the first time since the introduction of direct elections in 1979. A combination of security fears in the east and a consciousness throughout member states of the positive role that the EU had played during and after the Covid pandemic, appeared to encourage voter participation despite the difficult economic backdrop.

Thirdly, fears of the electoral process having been subjected to widespread manipulation through a mix of online disinformation, the use of artificial intelligence (deep fakes), and cyberattacks seemed to be largely unfounded in light of many reports to the contrary. The EU’s new regulations and the development of informal cooperation between electoral bodies during the last mandate seemed to have done the trick in assuring electoral processes’ resilience.

Finally, the elections were observed by two small assessment bodies: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ (ODIHR’s) international mission and Election-Watch.EU’s citizen observer mission. Their well-informed reports and recommendations should help support any electoral reform efforts during the next five years, especially those aimed at harmonising electoral processes across member states and legalising citizen observation throughout the EU.

Scratch beneath the surface, though, and that sigh of relief masks worrying developments in these elections and risks generating complacency among European decision-makers in tackling them. The pro-European centre survived, but the elections were characterised by a significant rise in support for far-right parties, most notably in France and Germany, where the European election results contributed in different ways to national political crises. At least a part of the high turnout figure came from that surge in support. Early reports also show that the presence of information manipulation and AI deep fakes was significantly higher in France and Germany than elsewhere.

Meanwhile, in the Parliament, the three far-right groups now have a combined total of 189 seats, one more than the largest political group, the EPP. There are already efforts being made to merge two of them (ECR and Patriots for Europe), efforts that will no doubt be encouraged by the outriders for President Trump, not least Elon Musk. The sheer size of these far-right groups is already making its presence felt in Parliament, since the EPP can choose to build majorities with them, which risks having a serious impact on key pieces of legislation in sensitive areas. These include migration, green and digital transitions, as well as international policies such as those supporting democracy and human rights. The next five years are certainly going to be a rocky ride for those of us working on democracy policy.

 

Venezuela: between authoritarianism and democratic resistance

The presidential elections in Venezuela on July 28 were held in the context of a complex humanitarian emergency, systematic human rights violations and the biggest migratory wave in the Americas, a product of a chronic and inextricable political conflict originated by the consolidation of hegemonic authoritarianism. In spite of the violence and disincentive to vote, the electoral participation was a bit over 60%, featuring over 10.88 million voters. To date, although the National Electoral Council (CNE) proclaimed Nicolás Maduro as the elected candidate, it has not confirmed this result by publication of the official results down to polling station and voting centre levels as required by law. Furthermore, its web page has been out of service for months. More importantly, this proclamation does not coincide with the results published by the opposition campaign and technical assistance team, ConVzla, which has reviewed and digitised 85.18% of the electoral acts. These records show Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia as president-elect by a wide margin.

Prior to the election a partial agreement on the promotion of political rights and electoral guarantees for all was reached, signed by the Venezuelan government and the United Democratic Platform (PUD), facilitated by the Kingdom of Norway. However, a number of guarantees set forth therein were subsequently flagrantly violated, as stated in the Declaration of the Carter Center Electoral Mission of July 30, 2024 and the Preliminary Report of the UN Mission of Experts of August 9, 2024. Special emphasis should particularly be placed on the free election of candidates by each of the parties that prevented María Corina Machado from being a candidate, despite having been elected in the opposition primaries by an overwhelming majority. Both the Carter Center and the UN Panel emphasised that the election in all its phases did not comply with international parameters and standards of electoral integrity and transparency; hence, it “cannot be considered as democratic”.

A few days before the new presidential term begins, in the midst of uncertainty and increased violence, five key lessons learned from this electoral process should be emphasised:

1. The publication and free dissemination of electoral records was crucial in providing transparency, by way of free access to information and defence of democracy by civil society, given both the CNE’s failure to honour its responsibilities and the general authoritarian advance;
2. The conjunction of an automated electoral system with digital and paper means of verification, added to the good organisation of citizens and political parties, were key in overcoming fear and disbelief, achieving widespread participation as well as denouncing institutional fraud given the evidence and ultimately exposing the truth;
3. The presence of international missions and the work of local organisations in electoral observation, were decisive in witnessing various irregularities in the electoral process, before, during and after election day, and influencing the international democratic community;
4. An agreement for the establishment of electoral guarantees can contribute to ensuring some minimum conditions are met or, at least, to helping denounce their violation;
5. Although a transparent electoral process is fundamental for a sustainable democratic transition, it is not enough. This act of peaceful resistance, by taking advantage of these kinds of cracks left by authoritarianism, reduces the level of asymmetry between the parties in conflict. However, the restoration of democratic institutionalisation would have required the signing of prior agreements that prefigure post-electoral guarantees for the losing candidate or coalition, regardless of the final results. In the absence of post-electoral guarantees, any progress towards potential political change would be unstable and even reversible.

 

Indonesia: new government, same playbook

Sustained democratic reform following the end of Suharto’s 32-year dictatorship quickly earned Indonesia the moniker of ‘beacon of democracy’ in Southeast Asia. Dubbed the largest single-day elections worldwide, in February 2024 over 204.8 million eligible voters were called to cast their votes at over 823,000 polling stations during the country’s latest elections.

In addition to the presidential race, voters simultaneously elected representatives for the 580-seats lower house and 152-seats upper house of the parliament. Statistically, these elections were a resounding success: voter turnout reached 82.39%, placing Indonesia well above the global average of 65.6%.

In the presidential race, Prabowo Subianto secured a victory at his third attempt in as many election cycles. Despite having accused the then-incumbent President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) of systemic electoral fraud following his second consecutive loss in 2019, Prabowo eventually joined Jokowi’s cabinet as Defence Minister in a move that some saw as a reconciliation of two opposing political arch-rivals. To others, though, this heralded impending political consolidation. With Prabowo on board, Jokowi’s governing coalition doubled its share of parliamentary seats (74%) compared to his first term (37%). By 2024, Jokowi had 91% of the parliament backing him, with the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) left as the odd one out in opposition. Previously, partly citing economic recovery following the Covid pandemic, Jokowi had postponed hundreds of subnational elections and handpicked 271 interim governors, mayors, and regents. All these set the stage for Jokowi to maintain his influence in the 2024 elections.

In addition to significantly weaker opposition and political consolidation, electoral integrity also took a major blow as Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, Anwar Usman—Jokowi’s brother-in-law—was found guilty of ethical misconduct. In a clear act of nepotism, he had presided over the judicial review case that created a loophole for 36-year old Gibran Rakabuming Raka—Jokowi’s eldest son and Anwar’s nephew—to run as Prabowo’s vice-presidential candidate despite the minimum 40-year old age limit set by the Constitution. Anwar was eventually removed from the chief justice position, albeit the nomination remained. Combined with the rise of his other family members in the political scene, critics have referred to Jokowi’s political manoeuvring throughout the electoral cycle as bending the rules to build a political dynasty.

With more than half of the eligible voters aged 17–40, Prabowo spent double in social media advertisement than his two competitors combined. Similarly, the legislative elections saw candidates spending an average of IDR 5 billion (EUR 300,000) to finance their campaigns and connect with much younger voters. In a country with only IDR 36 million (EUR 2,000) median annual income, average Indonesians would need to work 140 years without spending any of their salaries to be able to finance a political campaign.

In summary, maintaining a giant coalition which contributed significant resources to his campaign put Prabowo in an inexplicably strong position. In the shadow of Jokowi who seems keen to retain some of his influence, he is trapped between pushing for his economic reform agenda and restoring trust in democratic institutions.

 

Sri Lanka elections: possible end of a political duopoly?

Sri Lanka’s Presidential election on September 21 signified a number of firsts. It was the first election to be held since the popular uprising of 2022, known as the Aragalaya (The Struggle). 17.14 million people, the most ever, were eligible to vote in this race for Sri Lanka’s ninth Executive President. This election saw 38 candidates compete for the Presidency–the largest recorded number of candidates in a Presidential election in Sri Lanka’s history.

In the run-up to this election, many analysts correctly determined that neither candidate would be able to achieve a majority, as public opinion was split three-ways. There was much speculation on how each candidate’s campaign could affect the voting outcomes of the others. According to election officials, voter turnout was approximately 75% with many commentators calling this the most peaceful election Sri Lanka had ever had. For some voters, deciding between the top contenders was Hobson’s choice, given that none of the candidates was considered a valid option. Many others cast protest votes in order to prevent a candidate they disliked from winning. Nevertheless, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who for many months led the campaign with a large groundswell of support, emerged victorious after having received 42.31% of the votes cast—representing the greatest success he had ever achieved in terms of popular support over his entire political career.

Sri Lanka held parliamentary elections on November 14, 2024. This general election saw a massive overhaul and realignment of the political landscape in Sri Lanka. The National People’s Power (NPP) party managed to secure 159 of the 225 (196 elected members and 29 members via the National List) seats in the legislative body, the first time in Sri Lankan history that one political party had managed to secure more than two-thirds of the votes. NPP is a coalition of political parties and partner organisations that include youth associations, women’s groups, trade unions and left leaning civil society bodies.

NPP is also the first non-Tamil political party to win the Jaffna electoral district. With the combined results of the north and east provinces, home to a majority portion of the Sri Lankan ethnic and religious minorities, NPP still managed to secure the highest proportion of seats, toppling the longstanding dominance of the traditional ethnic parties in every district except for Batticaloa. It is also important to note that out of the 196 elected representatives, more than 150 are first time members of the parliament. Among the 159 elected and non-elected members from the NPP, two are female from the Hill Country (Malaiyaha) Tamils, one a disability rights activist who is also the first visually impaired lawmaker in Sri Lanka’s parliamentary history. This parliament also saw the highest number of female lawmakers at 22 members, 20 from NPP and 2 from SJB.

The departure of various veteran and established parliamentarians during this election cycle shows a convergence of the electorate’s common interests around economic issues, corruption and good governance. Such a convergence of interests supersedes traditional ethnic, religious considerations that played a significant part in the electoral process. However, this in no way signifies a ‘maturing’ of the electorate, but rather a temporary realignment of priorities that will in time regress to ethnic and religious divisions if common grievances are not addressed properly.

 

Moldova: elections and Kremlin's shadow

Moldova’s October 2024 elections and referendum, characterised by unprecedented Kremlin-sponsored influence attempts, highlighted a climate of profound political and geopolitical divisions in the country representing two drastically competing visions for Moldova’s future. The governing pro-EU Action and Solidarity party (PAS), led by President Maia Sandu, faced opposition from various parties and coalitions advocating for a more geopolitically neutral or even pro-Kremlin stance. PAS and Sandu ran on platforms emphasising closer ties with the EU and the US as well as further anti-corruption measures. The Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), led by former president Igor Dodon and represented in the elections by Alexandr Stoianoglo, sought neutrality but de facto economic and cultural links with Moscow.

The 2024 elections were pivotal due to certain key issues, including public frustration over persistent economic challenges. Sandu’s decision to hold the Constitutional referendum on whether to include the Moldovan citizens’ wishes for EU membership concurrently with the first round of the Presidential election almost backfired, as the West-based diaspora vote barely saved the positive outcome for the president. Similarly, Maia Sandu’s re-election was far from decisive and, once again, primarily dependent on the diaspora vote.

Ultimately, the vote represented a crucial test of Moldova’s capacity to protect and consolidate democratic institutions and advance European integration aspirations. It also served as a fascinating case study demonstrating not only how Kremlin-sponsored players attempt to hijack democratic institutions to pursue their anti-democratic goals, but also what tools institutions have to defend themselves.

Sandu’s near-failure to secure a strong pro-European mandate in the referendum further underscored the entrenched vulnerabilities in Moldova’s political fabric. The referendum strategy she pursued and linking the pro-EU agenda to her party did not really strengthen public confidence in her policies, but rather exposed dissatisfaction with her domestic policies and the country’s vulnerability to disinformation and malign influence.

The outcome proved that even with strong outside help, empty rhetoric will not move the electorate. While Sandu’s re-election and the referendum outcome were a fillip to her and her party, the country’s pro-EU path still hangs in the balance pending resolution of some serious issues and defects in its internal governance. Furthermore, Sandu faces a considerable challenge in engaging sceptics through genuine dialogue and fostering a pluralistic conversation about integration’s actual costs and benefits.

The Kremlin’s influence in Moldova’s 2024 elections has been thoroughly documented by the country’s authorities, independent observers together with the country’s investigative journalists. Reportedly, tens or possibly hundreds of millions of dollars were transferred from Russia in the months leading up to the election to buy votes from tens of thousands of Moldovan citizens. These efforts specifically targeted vulnerable groups, including rural voters and Russian-speaking citizens in Transnistria — areas that are less accessible to Moldovan law enforcement, exploiting existing socio-economic disparities and weak institutional oversight from the authorities. Additionally, the polarised media environment provided more channels for Russian influence.

International and domestic election observers were essential in assessing Moldova’s 2024 elections and recommending the authorities improve specific electoral processes. Missions from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI) as well as domestic observers monitored the referendum and presidential votes, noting improved legal frameworks, generally transparent procedures and the efficient work of electoral administration bodies. However, observers acknowledged the challenges posed by Kremlin-sponsored voter corruption networks, media bias and polarisation.

In sum, Moldova’s October 2024 elections showed the fragility and resilience of its democratic institutions. The country faces deep sociopolitical divides and aggressive external interference. To ensure that democratic gains are consolidated and not eroded in future, the country will need to confront long-stalled governance problems, consolidate electoral integrity and constructively debate with sceptics.

 

Hybrid tactics in Georgian elections and the EU impasse

Prime Minister Kobakhidze’s announcement on November 28 to reject accession negotiations with the EU, which Brussels had frozen five months earlier, sparked new protests across Georgia. They mark another wave of demonstrations following mass protests in early 2023 when the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party proposed a Russian-style ‘foreign agents’ law, which had already led to the dismantling of civil society in Russia.

With 80% of Georgians in favour of EU membership, today’s events bring to mind the 2013 protests in Ukraine, triggered by the rejection of EU integration by a government allied to Moscow. The parallels also apply to Belarus, where violent repression followed the disputed 2020 elections.

The October 26 parliamentary elections, widely criticised by both domestic and international observers as deeply flawed, expose a calculated and multifaceted hybrid strategy by the Georgian Dream government, based on a mix of legal manipulation, disinformation, technological misuse, coercion, intimidation together with outright voter bribery.

The Russian-style ‘foreign agents’ law sought to undermine citizens’ ability to oversee the vote by discrediting and paralysing monitoring organisations. Changes to election laws aimed to tighten government control over electoral administration. A disinformation campaign used conspiracy theories and fears of a Russian war against Ukraine. Meanwhile, coercion activity targeted more than 320,000 public sector employees—around 9% of the electorate—including those in education, pressuring them to support the ruling party in exchange for retaining social benefits.

Using privileged access to public data, the government identified and targeted vulnerable groups, including nearly 700,000 citizens—18% of the population—living below the poverty line. The elderly, disabled, ill, educationally disadvantaged and national minorities faced voter bribery efforts.

New voting technologies, initially introduced to enhance transparency, were weaponised for electoral fraud through the misuse of voter ID data and non-transparent ballot scanning. Cameras installed by GD in polling stations, ‘coordinators call centres’ and unidentified individuals near polling stations fostered an atmosphere of surveillance and intimidation.

Despite extensive mobilisation by citizen observers, including ISFED, GYLA and MyVote, they were unable to prevent fraud in such a manipulated environment. All major complaints filed by the opposition, election monitors and the president were dismissed.

The OSCE’s International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) has so far failed to assess properly the impact of electoral manipulations on the final results. The European Parliament’s resolution later criticised the limitations of the IEOM’s observation methodology and called for a re-run of the election, highlighting the growing discord among European institutions. To make matters worse, French senator Pascal Allizard, leader of the OSCE short-term observation mission, issued a controversial letter to the Georgian Foreign Minister during the ongoing protests, aligning with narratives of “fake observers” flagged by the European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE) network. This disunity among European actors, alongside the failure to implement promised initiatives such as the EU’s technical mission, has eroded trust and deepened disillusionment with Western support among Georgian civil society.

Europe and its transatlantic allies must move beyond symbolic gestures. They need to unite in demanding an end to violence against the opposition, civil society and the media. Furthermore, they must not only urge the government to release political prisoners, but also launch investigations into election fraud and political persecutions. They should also support calls for a re-run of the elections and boost support for civil society and independent media. In the long term, they must offer deeper political, social and economic ties to a democratic Georgia.

 

Authors

 

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

 

Photo credit: CC-BY-4.0: © European Union 2024 – Source : EP.