Richard Youngs
Richard Youngs

Much has been written about the surge in support for far-right parties in the last several years. One particularly striking development is the increasing number of young people who are drawn to and vote for such parties. While most attention has been on the far right in Europe, the question arises of whether wider trends are applicable to other parts of the world.

We asked 12 young researchers from our project on youth and democracy for their views and experiences on the far right in their respective countries. A highly varied picture emerged. In some countries, the youth have been drawn to the far right, but not in others, while in some places, the far-right framing has little relevance to the nature of local politics. Moreover, although there are common patterns, a varied set of factors drives the far right’s appeal among the youth across regions. Hearing from young people from a global spread of countries paints a nuanced picture that sheds some doubt on the increasingly common generalisations now made about the youth and the far right.

 

Youth perspectives on far-right trends

Photo of Intifar Chowdhury
Intifar Chowdhury

In early 2024, various media outlets, including the Financial Times, the Economist, and the Conversation, revealed a new puzzle in established democracies worldwide: a widening gender gap in political ideology among the youth. While young women increasingly lean towards progressive views, young men are shifting towards conservatism. This divide is especially pronounced among Gen Z, for whom gender is becoming a significant predictor of ideological alignment.

At the same time, there also appears to be a generational divide driven by young men who may feel threatened by the progress women have made in traditionally male-dominated areas. Unlike older men, who are more secure in their careers or retired, young men facing precarious post-Covid-19 economic conditions are more prone to a backlash against feminism. They perceive institutions as biased against men, making them more susceptible to right-wing authoritarian ideals.

In the United States (US), newly inaugurated President Donald Trump has effectively tapped into this discontent by fostering a macho culture and portraying men as victims in a society where women’s privileges are perceived to have gone too far. Social media plays a significant role in this polarisation among young digital natives, as it fosters echo chambers in which extreme views, including misogyny, can be amplified.

This context is essential to understanding how far-right parties are successfully engaging with the youth and influencing their political participation, often exploiting the gender divide to their advantage.

 

Ideological shifts among young people in post-2021 Afghanistan

Photo of Wasal Faqiryar
Wasal Faqiryar

After the fall of Afghanistan’s republican government to the Taliban in 2021, Afghan youth found themselves in a new environment dominated by a fundamentalist movement. As the new regime became established, its ideology gradually began to resonate with certain segments of the youth. To some, the Taliban’s emphasis on restoring tradition, order, and cultural identity might hold a certain appeal. Indeed, such views are slowly becoming more ingrained in the thoughts of young Afghans in both urban and rural areas and of varying education levels – due to regime indoctrination, a lack of other choices, or desperation.

The Taliban’s emphasis on a return to strict Islamic values has a parallel in the far right’s appeal to traditional values, whether religious, cultural, or national. The Taliban’s victory was even praised by far-right white extremists, indicating their alignment with similar ideologies or values. This support underscores a troubling connection between extremist groups across different contexts. Religious values are particularly important in Afghanistan, where religion plays a central role in everyday life, and the use of religious narratives in extremist propaganda has been particularly prevalent since 2021. This comes with an acute level of exclusion for women, as the Taliban rigidly enforces an increasingly gender-segregated society. As such, it is difficult to gauge young women’s views and assess whether these diverge from those of young men.

In economic terms, high unemployment and a lack of opportunities are driving Afghan youth away from the Taliban. However, those recruited by the group and its advocates embrace state-led narratives that promote self-reliance and reject Western-influenced systems. These segments of the youth are attracted to the Taliban’s emphasis on patriotism and nationalism as well as their promises to restore Afghanistan’s national pride and reverse perceived injustices.

 

The UK and the far right

Photo of Ellie Catherall
Ellie Catherall

Following July’s election, the United Kingdom (UK) seemed to be bucking the trend of increasing youth support for far-right parties as seen in France and Germany. In Britain, while those under 30 were more likely to reject mainstream parties than any other age group, only 6% voted for Nigel Farage’s Reform UK. Farage was unable to appeal to youth voters on social media in the way that his European counterparts have, although this may change now that he has a 23-year-old managing his TikTok campaign.

However, this does not mean that all British young people reject right-wing views. According to the Financial Times, far-right sentiment is just as common in the UK as in the rest of Europe. The fact that youth turnout was predicted to have been particularly low in the UK election could also obscure the degree of support the far right has among younger people who, for whatever reason, did not vote this year.

There is also a divergence beginning to emerge between men and women. According to polling data collected by Savanta in June 2024, men aged 18–25 are more than twice as likely to vote for Reform UK, which is a right-wing populist political party, as women of the same age.

The spate of racist and Islamophobic riots in cities across the UK following the killing of three children at a dance studio in Southport in July illustrates the degree to which right-wing ideals are held. Fuelled by social media and disinformation, videos online showed shocking acts of violence against racial minorities. Alarmingly, many young men and boys, some as young as 11, could be seen taking part.

One cannot be complacent by believing that the UK is different from the rest of Europe in terms of youth support for the far right. It is possible that these views and values will translate into electoral success for radical right-wing parties in the future.

 

Bhutan’s political culture: pragmatism over ideology

Photo
Dechen Rabgyal

In January 2024, Bhutan chose its fourth democratic government. As political rallies gained momentum, the increased cost of living and unemployment became the key issues around which voters were mobilised. In other parts of the world, the far right uses such economic woes to build a compelling narrative that links these economic issues to increased mobility. Disenchanted youth are easily drawn to messages about concerns such as immigration-induced insecurities. Ethnicity, race, and religion become instruments of othering, while identity-based politics are more effective than ideals-based politics.

Inflation, poor public services, and unemployment dominated Bhutan’s election. Politicians’ pledges included farm road maintenance and chain-link fencing, while promises of free school meals and uniforms blurred the boundaries between welfare policies and populist tendencies. With 51% of the country’s population aged 30 or under and the youth unemployment rate at 28% in 2022, political attention was focused on the youth. Parties pledged to boost training, make overseas study and work easier, and establish a one-stop career centre for the youth.

The competing ideas presented in campaign debates, however, do not necessarily result in an ideological divide. Perhaps Bhutan’s constitutional provision, which bars candidates and political parties from appealing to regionalism, ethnicity, or religion to garner votes for electoral gain, reduces avenues for divisive politics. The state’s pursuit of Gross National Happiness as a declared goal also moderates any ideological differences. It is, therefore, difficult to place Bhutanese political parties on the left, right, or centre of the political spectrum, let alone on the far right. Furthermore, in an environment where the political mainstream is not always active outside election cycles, politics revolves more around specific issues than ideology.

 

The far right and the youth in Latin America’s southern cone

Photo of Olga Paredes Britez
Olga Paredes Britez

The third wave of the far right in Latin America, led by Brazil’s former president Jair Bolsonaro, is characterised by its alliances with agribusiness, the military, and evangelical sectors. These relationships have been combined with anti-rights agendas and the denial of past dictatorships, as seen under current President Javier Milei in Argentina. In Paraguay, the Colorado Party, currently under the leadership of Horacio Cartes, has consolidated this agenda by recentralising state resources and persecuting civil society organisations.

Two long-standing tactics of the far right in the region are discouraging youth participation in public policies and criminalising young people who attempt to engage. It is no coincidence that youth policies emerged after the fall of dictatorships in South America. Historically, during the military dictatorships that marked the first wave of the far right and the rise of neoliberalism that represented the second wave, young people were excluded from policies and relegated to either mandatory military service or precarious employment. In the current context, they continue to be marginalised in political decision-making, while repression of their protests remains the norm.

The Paraguayan March (El Marzo Paraguayio) is an important example of resisting repression; this was a citizen uprising led by young people against Colorado Party government in 1999. Similar mobilisations driven by the youth opposition movements took place in 2017 and 2021. In 1999, the state committed systematic violence known as juvenicidio against eight young demonstrators. In 2017, a young political opposition activist was killed by the police during the protests. In recent years, dozens of young activists have been persecuted through the courts for protesting against the government. This constant repression not only discourages youth participation but also perpetuates the far right’s dominance and stifles alternative movements for change among the younger generation.

 

Using fear and division to influence the youth in Mozambique

Photo of Dércio Tsandzana
Dércio Tsandzana

The spread of fear by extremist groups, such as the armed Islamist movements in Mozambique, has been one of the key reasons for young people’s lack of trust in formal politics. As a consequence, conspiracy theories and efforts to deepen polarisation have gained traction in Mozambique’s already complex social and political landscape. One of the tactics that extremist groups have used is promoting violent solutions to conflicts. In this sense, they often exploit young people’s desperation and lack of opportunities to sell them unrealistic dreams.

Therefore, young people must remain cautious of the dubious offers that extreme political groups present as solutions. Fostering dialogue and demanding accountability from elected politicians are key strategies in this regard. It is important that politics unites young people rather than promoting division among them. Likewise, digital spaces should be used as part of the solution, not as a divisive tool to convey extremist political messages. Therefore, political parties must lead by example in how they conduct politics to engage young people.

 

Choosing pragmatism: why Zimbabwe’s youth are sticking to entrenched political parties

Photo of Oripha Chimwara
Oripha Chimwara

While it is true that the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) is primarily a leftist nationalist party rather than a far-right one, it is interesting to consider how extremism affects the youth in countries such as Zimbabwe. Young Zimbabweans’ loyalty to ZANU-PF is due to the party’s modus operandi and the opposition’s failure to project an effective, unified, and successful alternative.

ZANU-PF’s dominant strategy is based on exploiting state resources and institutions, which are viewed as the party’s extended empire. Faced with unemployment, the youth are drawn to the party for economic benefits, such as access to land, mining rights, and jobs. Recently, the ZANU-PF government has appointed young people to ministerial positions and other roles in government institutions. Therefore, many young Zimbabweans believe their welfare will improve if they align themselves with ZANU-PF.

At the same time, the opposition party that emerged in 1999 with the name Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has been plagued by infighting that has resulted in splits, dividing the party’s vote share over the years. The party has metamorphosed from the MDC, through several iterations, into the current Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC). Yet, even after the CCC won seats in the Zimbabwean parliament in the 2023 general election, the party disintegrated, leaving its parliamentarians with the option of either resigning or continuing in office under new leadership. As the CCC’s 2023 presidential candidate subsequently moved on to form a new party, it is unclear whether the remaining CCC parliamentarians are part of the new movement or not. All of these factional fights affect the opposition’s chances of taking power.

Consequently, because of frustrations, unfulfilled hopes, and a weak and inexperienced opposition, the youth in Zimbabwe have, over the years, been pushed to align their interests with ZANU-PF as a means of carving out a living, despite the negative or apathetic views they might have of the party’s strategies.

 

The new face of far-right politics in Turkey

Photo of Mehmet Ilhanli
Mehmet İlhanlı

“If we lower the voting age to 12, we could secure power on our own,” said Ümit Özdağ, leader of Turkey’s Victory Party (VP), in a live TV programme in 2022, emphasising the party’s appeal among the Turkish youth. VP marks a significant shift in Turkey’s far-right politics, which is now characterised by anti-immigrant rhetoric, in contrast with the traditional focus of ultra-nationalist movements. In the late 1960s and 1970s, Turkish nationalists, particularly the youth-led Idealist Hearths, mobilised against what they perceived as the communist threat. By the 1980s and 1990s, the group had turned to combating Kurdish groups. In both periods, Turkey’s enemy was seen to be inside the country.

The Syrian civil war, which started in 2011, brought a new wave of refugees to Turkey, altering the landscape of far-right politics in the country. Unlike its predecessors, VP did not engage in street mobilisation but instead leveraged social media, particularly TikTok, to spread its anti-immigrant messages. The party targeted disillusioned youth who were burdened by Turkey’s economic difficulties and democratic backsliding. Now, the enemy is perceived as coming from outside the country through what Özdağ calls “strategically engineered migration”.

Following the success of far-right parties in the June 2024 European Parliament elections, Özdağ advocated lowering the voting age to 16, recognising the party’s strong youth support base. VP’s focus on lowering the voting age not only highlights the group’s strategy to harness the frustrations of Turkey’s youth but also marks a broader shift in Turkish far-right politics. The struggle for influence is now increasingly fought online, where the far right aims to convince the youth that outsiders are quietly occupying the country.

 

Left or right in Ghana: does it even matter?

Photo of .Obaa Akua Konadu-Osei
Obaa Akua Konadu-Osei

While political ideologies matter, they do not hold as prominent a place in elections in Ghana as they do in other democracies. During the Ghanaian election campaigns, politicians attempt to distinguish themselves by highlighting their competence based on their track records and personality traits. Elections in Ghana also tend to focus on visible socio-economic development outcomes, such as infrastructure projects and cuts to utility prices.

In an interview in January 2024, Nana Kwame Bediako, a presidential aspirant in the 2024 general election, who positioned himself as a third force beyond the duopoly of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), was asked about his political stance. He replied with a question about the political ideologies of the NPP and the NDC, which, he was told, are centre-right and centre-left, respectively. Of his own position, Bediako said, “I am the striker”, conflating political jargon with the language of football. He continued, “I am for the people who want change.” The commentary that ensued among many young Ghanaian users of X (formerly Twitter) was along the lines of “Ideologies aren’t necessary; we want someone who can deliver.”

Young Ghanaian voters appear not to be swayed by the narratives of left or right. Instead, they lean towards pragmatism, where decisions are made based on what is most effective in the current circumstances. Therefore, the political participation of Ghana’s youth tends to be based on needs as opposed to grounded in long-term party loyalty. This inclination encourages politicians to adopt more solutions-oriented promises to gain the youth’s support.

Given the loose affiliation with ideologies in Ghana’s political landscape, pragmatism should encourage politicians to deliver for citizens and not to offer empty ideology-based promises, since voters’ loyalty cannot be assured.

 

Directing the political narrative: a winning formula in Slovenia

Photo of Ajda Hedžet
Ajda Hedžet

In the June 2024 European Parliament elections, Slovenia experienced a significant shift to the right, with the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) winning the most seats. Among the most surprising outcomes was the election of 28-year-old Zala Tomašič, a newcomer on Slovenia’s political stage, who became the country’s youngest-ever member of the European Parliament. Tomašič’s campaign was anchored in the slogan “God, Family, and Homeland”, designed to resonate with fundamental Slovenian values while echoing the motto of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s party. This message was strategically crafted to appeal to far-right-leaning voters across Slovenia.

Despite her inexperience, Tomašič’s victory was propelled by a meticulously planned media strategy that exclusively used SDS-owned communication channels and an active social media presence. She hosted Signal, a talk show on Nova24TV – a channel with close ties to the SDS and directed by Tomašič’s father – which gave her direct access to the party’s core audience and solidified her support among older, traditional right-wing voters.

Simultaneously, Tomašič effectively leveraged social media platforms like TikTok, X (formerly Twitter), and Facebook to engage younger voters. Her TikTok videos, which often target opposition parties, garnered between 5,000 and 40,000 views each and helped extend her reach and mobilise a younger demographic often disengaged from politics.

By combining the extensive reach of party-oriented media channels, which are controlled by her father, and a robust social media strategy, this political newcomer successfully drove the narrative to appeal to both older and younger right-wing voters and secure a historic win.

 

Viewing the far right from the US south

Photo of Mark Ortiz
Mark Ortiz

I grew up just outside Birmingham, Alabama, a city perhaps best known in national and international consciousness as a key site of US civil rights activism. Much of this work prominently featured children and young people, such as the Children’s Crusade. Birmingham is nestled in a state and a region – the US south – that in 2016 formed a solid red bloc, paving the way for Donald Trump’s election as president.

Birmingham has a long history of racist violence and terrorism. In light of this history, it has been no surprise to me to see the resurgence of far-right forces in the US. Such ideologies, grounded in nativism, white supremacy, and nostalgic revanchism, have long been an undercurrent – if not an overtone – of US conservatism, finding particularly violent expressions in certain communities and regions.

Birmingham’s duality as both a site of racialised terror and inequity, on the one hand, and home to some of the most powerful organised resistance to white supremacist politics, on the other, speaks to the dialectic nature of power and resistance. It is from the communities and regions where entrenched and revanchist movements seek to roll back civil rights and environmental protections with impunity that some of the most promising, liberating, and deep democratic visions of change emerge. These visions are often led by African-American, Latin American, or other black, indigenous, and people-of-colour communities living on the front lines of oppressive systems.

For scholars hoping to meet this moment, it is critical to unearth and analyse the long histories of far-right thinking with a historical perspective and characterise place-based alternatives that aim to deepen democratic decision-making.

 

The right wing and the youth in India

Photo of Ambar Kumar Ghosh
Ambar Kumar Ghosh

As a vibrant multi-party democracy, India has a plethora of political parties that represent a wide array of ideological positions and socio-cultural and regional interests. The country’s cultural right-wing forces started to consolidate in the 1980s and eventually gained electoral prominence towards the end of the 20th century.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is the most prominent political group on India’s right wing, which comprises a range of social, cultural, and political outfits. The BJP’s unprecedented rise as the central force in Indian politics since 2014 marks an era of the right wing’s political dominance at the national and state levels. Under the charismatic leadership of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the BJP has become a hegemonic political force that has succeeded in broadening the right’s support base by including disadvantaged groups, women, and the youth, as well as the traditional constituencies of conservatives and upper castes.

Unlike the traditional supporters of India’s cultural right wing, which is based on the religious majoritarian agenda of the Hindutva ideology, the right wing’s emerging broader socio-political base is grounded in many other factors.

First, many supporters are attracted by promises of development, governance, and employment as well as claims that the right wing marks a departure from the alleged corruption and institutional decay under previous governments and coalitions led by the Indian National Congress, which held power for over five decades after India’s independence. Given that India has the largest youth population, those promises hold even greater significance for them.

Second, the right wing makes compelling claims about boosting India’s national pride, invoking the country’s civilisational greatness, and strengthening its security against neighbouring rivals like Pakistan. These claims help buttress nationalist pride among sizable sections of the youth.

Third and crucially, the right wing under the present regime calls for the delivery of governance through the personality cult of Modi and a narrative of strong, bold, and effective leadership. Such calls resonate with citizens, especially the youth, who are fatigued with institutional decay and the inefficient delivery of everyday governance and welfare.

The increasing electoral salience of India’s right wing among the youth can, therefore, be attributed to many factors other than the traditional focus on cultural exclusivity and majoritarianism. The effective and widespread use of social media has also played a pivotal role in enabling the right wing to communicate with and mobilise people, particularly the youth.

 

Authors

Richard Youngs is a senior fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, based at Carnegie Europe.

Intifar Chowdhury, Wasal Faqiryar, Ellie Catherall, Dechen Rabgyal, Olga Paredes Britez, Dércio Tsandzana, Oripha Chimwara, Mehmet Ilhanli, Obaa Akua Konadu-Osei, Ajda Hedžet, Mark Ortiz, and Ambar Kumar Ghosh are part of the Young Researchers’ Network. For their biographies, please refer to the Youth Democracy Cohort page.

 

This publication was produced as part of the WYDE Civic Engagement powered by the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) and European Union that seeks to enhance the involvement of youth in democratic processes at national, regional, and global levels.

Photo credit: Mika Baumeister, Unsplash