Zambia’s Cautionary Tale of Democratic Opening

Zambia’s 2021 general election represented a window of democratic opportunity, offering the chance to unseat former President Edgar Lungu’s increasingly authoritarian Patriotic Front (PF) government. It is not always the case that a transfer of power leads to democratic renewal, of course. The first two transfers of power in Zambia, in 1991 and 2011, saw the emergence of new governments that spoke the language of democracy but engaged in the practices of authoritarianism.

In 2021, however, two factors suggested that a change of government was particularly likely to generate opportunities for democratic strengthening. First, the main opposition leader, the United Party of National Development’s (UPND’s) Hakainde Hichilema, had publicly committed to reversing some of the democratic backsliding that had taken place under Lungu. Second, concerns had grown so high about corruption and dysfunction in the PF government that while there was no guarantee that Hichilema would prove to be a democrat, it seemed inconceivable that he would be as problematic as Lungu.

A combination of firm international support and an active civil society helped encourage a peaceful transfer of power. However, disappointing trends in Zambia’s governance trajectory over the past year suggest the international community was too eager to believe in the new government’s democratic credentials.

Zambia’s chequered progress towards democracy

Zambia has oscillated between shorter democratic episodes and longer authoritarian malaise since the reintroduction of multi-party politics in the early 1990s. The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) made headlines around the world in 1991 when it inflicted a landslide defeat on the government of former President Kenneth Kaunda, who had ruled Zambia since 1972, in one of Africa’s first democratic transfers of power.

The MMD rapidly lapsed into corruption and mismanagement, however, and in 1996 changed the Zambian constitution to prevent Kaunda from contesting that year’s election. A second burst of democratic optimism accompanied the MMD’s defeat by Michael Sata’s PF in 2011, but Sata’s untimely death and replacement by Lungu in 2015 went hand in hand with another slide towards authoritarianism.

The build-up to the 2021 election highlighted not only Zambians’ belief that elections can be used to hold a government accountable but also a widespread understanding on the part of citizens, journalists, and civil society groups that they can generate a destabilising political crisis.

The combination of severe economic challenges, ongoing corruption controversies, and efforts by Hichilema’s campaign team to soften his image and broaden his support base led to a growing perception that the country was set for its third transfer of power via the ballot box. In response, Lungu oversaw an escalation of authoritarian strategies designed to entrench the PF’s hold on power. This included intimidation of political opponents and critical voices by the security forces and PF cadres and gangs as well as misuse of state resources for private gain. To support the activities of the ruling party, the government infiltrated civil society, the media, and academic groups; subverted key democratic institutions, notably the judiciary, the constitutional court, and the electoral commission; and disrupted Hichilema’s campaign by denying his party travel permits and permissions to hold rallies.

The unprecedented deployment of the military ahead of the polls, ostensibly to maintain order amid growing political tensions, led to concerns that Lungu was planning to break with precedent and retain power through force. These fears appeared to be coming to pass on election day itself, when the government throttled internet access, effectively shutting down social media. Then, Lungu released two statements claiming that the election had not been free or fair and so the result should be set aside.

These statements implied not only that Lungu believed he would lose the vote but also that he was unwilling to accept defeat. The president’s ability to hold on to power was undermined, however, by parallel vote tabulations conducted by the UPND and the Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG), the country’s main domestic election-monitoring outfit. These vote counts revealed that Hichilema had won a landslide victory, securing almost 60% of the vote. After a short political crisis that saw an intense period of negotiations behind closed doors, Lungu conceded defeat and Zambia experienced a peaceful transfer of power.

The government of President Hichilema subsequently kept several of its promises to restore democracy, most notably removing political cadres from the streets and bus parks. Yet, the UPND also faced major economic challenges, and against a backdrop of growing public frustration there are concerning signs that it has already begun to fall back on some of the tactics used by its predecessor. This has led to growing criticism of the ruling party’s treatment of the opposition and the judiciary as well as its stalled anti-corruption agenda.

International donor responses to Zambia’s window of opportunity

Zambia’s mixed history means that although the country is often viewed as one of Africa’s more competitive and open democracies, a lack of media freedom, corruption, and repression of the opposition have consistently been sources of concern for civil society groups and the international community.

Against this background, the European Union (EU) and other international donors, such as the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), have played important roles in supporting democratic politics in Zambia. This has included funding civil society groups, engaging in legislative strengthening programmes, providing training and financial support to the electoral commission, deploying election observers, and using diplomatic influence to deter authoritarian abuses.

The EU and other international donors were well aware of the risk that the 2021 election could be manipulated, given the controversy that had surrounded the 2016 vote. This risk was especially clear in light of Lungu’s repeated attempts to exert partisan influence over key democratic institutions. International donors also understood that the government’s efforts to infiltrate and intimidate civil society meant that non-governmental organisations and government critics were operating in a particularly constrained environment.

The EU response

In response to the situation in Zambia in 2021, the EU’s engagement focused on four areas: strengthening the electoral system; protecting access to justice and human rights; improving public financial management; and ensuring gender equity, including women’s empowerment and the fight against gender-based violence. The EU’s broader support programme also continued to fund civil society groups in an effort to sustain them at a particularly difficult moment while using diplomatic leverage behind the scenes to try to limit government harassment of these groups.

In addition, the EU contributed to the Democracy Strengthening in Zambia (DSZ) fund, managed by the United Nations Development Programme to support the country’s electoral process. This included allocating €7 million to “support stakeholders who work in the electoral cycle” to “strengthen democracy in Zambia and contribute to increasing the transparency and accountability of public institutions to ensure a credible electoral process”. Some of these resources went towards the logistical costs of the CCMG domestic observers and iVerify, a fact-checking and response mechanism designed to counter disinformation.

At the same time, the EU supported the implementation of the recommendations of its election observation mission (EOM) report following the 2016 election and deployed another EOM for the 2021 poll. When it appeared that Lungu might refuse to give up power, senior EU representatives used intermediaries around the president to encourage him to respect the rule of law and allow the electoral process to take its course.

The UK and US responses

The most prominent donors outside the EU framework, the UK and the US, adopted similar approaches but in some cases were willing to be more proactive and outspoken. The US, for example, supported civil society organisations and domestic monitoring. Funding was also provided through the US Agency for International Development to enable the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to support the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ). After an initial assessment identified a particular need to provide training in election conflict and crisis management to provincial and district election officers, many of whom were new, IFES delivered nationwide training.

This programmatic electoral support was bolstered by particularly strong public statements by US Chargé d’Affaires David Young in favour of free and fair elections. This bolder strategy promised to be more effective at discouraging the government from stealing the election, but it came with a greater likelihood of triggering a government backlash – a calculated risk that Young was empowered to take in part because he was soon to leave Zambia for another posting.

In the days leading up to the election, Young issued a statement that “the US is prepared to apply financial sanctions, visa restrictions and travel bans on people who will violate human rights and democratic freedoms of Zambians in this year’s general elections”. By making such clear and strong pronouncements, Young was able to raise the stakes of electoral manipulation for the Lungu government while easing the pressure on some of the more risk-averse members of the international community to speak out.

For its part, the UK contributed £500,000 (€600,000) to the DSZ fund and targeted its support to four key imperatives: more transparent, efficient, and inclusive elections; stronger and faster local resolution of electoral disputes; fair access to and coverage on public media for all contenders; and support for authorities to provide a safe civic and political space. The UK also allocated significant funding to strengthen its cooperation with Zambian organisations to “ensure that local observers have sufficient resources and capacity to monitor polling [and that] access to the electoral process is not denied to those who live on the margins of society – the poorest, the disabled and the voiceless”.

As with the US, UK High Commissioner to Zambia Nick Woolley complemented these investments with clear public statements in favour of respecting democratic norms and values. As the former colonial power, however, the UK was careful to avoid creating the impression that it was interfering in the process and to learn from recent experiences in Kenya and Zimbabwe, where incumbent governments had manipulated anti-colonial sentiment to mobilise support.

When it started to look like Lungu would refuse to stand down, the UK and the US worked with other donors to emphasise the economic and political risks to Zambia – and to the president’s reputation and future – of attempting to hold on to power through force. The UK and the US also understood the value of supporting Zambian and other African mediators, such as former President Rupiah Banda and Sierra Leonean President Ernest Bai Koroma, who was in Lusaka to lead an African Union EOM, and of communicating key messages through these channels.

This approach was particularly useful because Lungu ultimately refused requests for face-to-face meetings with western representatives in the days after the election. Meanwhile, the combined efforts of Banda and Koroma proved fundamental to resolving the impasse.

Taken together, these international efforts played an important role in encouraging a peaceful transfer of power. To understand how significant this role was relative to other factors, it is necessary to take a step back and review the main domestic forces at play during the 2021 election.

The importance of domestic factors

One reason for Hichilema’s success is that his campaign team went to great lengths to both soften his image and extend his reach into new parts of the country. Citizens responded extremely positively to these efforts, in part because of the economic downturn under Lungu and a sense that government corruption was making it worse. On voting day, Zambians turned out in large numbers, which reflected a deep commitment to changing power through peaceful and democratic means and a confidence that this was still possible even under repressive conditions, given the experiences of 1991 and 2011.

When it became clear that the election was going against Lungu and the government began to pressure the ECZ to nullify the outcome, a second set of factors kicked in. The parallel vote tabulation conducted by the CCMG and the UPND was important because it made clear that Hichilema had won by a landslide, making it extremely difficult for the PF to claim victory.

The two vote counts also complemented one another. The UPND tally sought to capture all polling stations and so was more comprehensive, but it was also more vulnerable to accusations that it was partisan and biased. The CCMG tally was based on a much smaller sample of polling stations but was conducted independently in line with international best practice, so it was harder for government leaders to disparage.

Zambian civil society groups also played significant roles. Among these groups were organisations such as the CCMG, the Alliance for Community Action, and the Chapter One Foundation; well-known activists and youth mobilisers, like the musician Pilato; and alternative sources of information, such as News Diggers. In addition to informing citizens about corruption and democratic backsliding, civil society groups consistently challenged abuses of power, including during the election. On 13 August 2021, for example, the Chapter One Foundation initiated judicial review proceedings against the Zambia Information and Communications Technology Authority to challenge the government’s internet shutdown and obtained an order to have the internet restored

The weight of public opinion, the evidence from the parallel vote tabulation, and the activism of civil society all shaped the context in which ECZ leaders had to decide how to handle the election. Just one day after ballots had been cast, it was already clear that there was no credible way for the commission to announce any outcome other than a Hichilema victory. ECZ leaders therefore knew that failure to do so would incur the wrath of the Zambian people, civil society groups, and international donors.

It was at this stage that high-level mediation became critical. Banda played an important part here, in line with past precedent: Kaunda had played the same role in persuading Banda to stand down in 2011. Indeed, it was Banda who led the first direct phone conversation between Lungu and Hichilema, whose relationship was extremely tense after Lungu had arrested his rival on trumped-up charges of treason. During the phone call, both men called each other “president”, a symbolic moment that marked the beginning of the end of the political crisis.

Zambia’s peaceful transfer of power was therefore driven primarily by domestic factors and the bravery and determination of the country’s citizens and civil society groups. Yet, international efforts to bolster and support Zambian democratic forces played an important role in creating the environment in which this could happen. Civil society groups were strengthened by international funding and the use of diplomatic influence to deter the intimidation of their leaders. Both ECZ officials and CCMG observers received international funding and training.

During the crisis that followed Lungu’s initial rejection of the election result, EU, UK, and US representatives deployed coordinated pressure to encourage the government to respect the democratic process and the rule of law. The strength of their position in these conversations was enhanced by the EU EOM, which found no evidence to back up Lungu’s claims that the election had been manipulated to favour the UPND.

By engaging in this way, Zambia’s international donors significantly strengthened the position of Banda and other mediators in bringing Lungu and Hichilema together and encouraging the former to stand down. The election would therefore have been considerably less fair, and the political crisis more prolonged, had it not been for the EU and other donors.

Moreover, in addition to making the right interventions, international donors pursued them in the right way. Applying pressure behind the scenes while supporting the mediation of African leaders both shielded the international community from backlash and enabled Zambian figures and processes of dispute resolution, such as the diplomacy of past presidents, to take centre stage. This practice of leading from behind strengthened the position of pro-democracy forces in Zambia and ensured the transition would be remembered as a homegrown victory for democracy – thus bolstering the confidence of civil society groups and citizens for the next struggle.

International efforts to support Zambian democracy

The international community’s impact on the struggle for democracy in Zambia after the election is more complex and controversial. After the transfer of power, donors were quick to support the new government, both to capitalise on the window of opportunity and in recognition of the vast challenges facing Hichilema’s presidency. These included the debt crisis it inherited – in 2020, Zambia had become the first African country to default on its Eurobond debt – and a stalling economy with low growth and job creation. The EU increased its cooperation budget with Zambia by pledging an additional €60 million, with €14 million targeted at civil society groups, deepening the union’s commitment to Zambia’s democratic institutions.

Other donors made similar decisions, buoyed by evidence that constraints on civil society and the media were being lifted. The government’s efforts to remove political cadres from public areas created a sense of democratic renewal. This momentum gained pace when the government announced that it would abolish the death penalty and planned to introduce a Public Gathering Bill to repeal and replace Zambia’s controversial Public Order Act. International optimism reached its zenith in March 2023, when Zambia, Costa Rica, the Netherlands, South Korea, and the US co-hosted the second Summit for Democracy in Lusaka.

Yet, well before the summit, the long period that it took to negotiate a deal on debt restructuring, combined with high levels of inflation, had started to erode popular support for Hichilema. In turn, the government became increasingly willing to engage in a range of authoritarian behaviours that significantly undermined its democratic credibility.

These abuses include what United Nations special rapporteurs described as the “arbitrary arrests and detentions on charges of, inter alia, unlawful assembly, espionage, hate speech and seditious practices against opposition political party leaders and members, parliamentarians, human rights defenders and activists, as well as restrictions on gatherings, meetings, peaceful protests and rallies”. As a result, Zambia declined marginally on the Liberal Democracy Index produced by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute. On a scale from 0 to 1, the country fell from 0.43 in 2022 to 0.42 in 2023, having previously improved substantially from 0.31 to 0.43 during the UPND’s first year in charge.

Lessons for the future

Zambia’s disappointing trend along some governance indicators over the last 12 months raises important questions about the durability of democratic transitions. A key lesson from the Zambian experience is the risk of the international community being too willing to believe that a new government is genuinely committed to democratisation and too slow to express concern when evidence of democratic backsliding first emerges.

While Woolley spoke publicly about the need to avoid restricting political space and allow opposition parties to organise and mobilise on social media, EU representatives have so far said little to address the UPND government’s treatment of opposition leaders. In turn, this has led to accusations that the international community is acting inconsistently and hypocritically.

There appear to be several reasons for the EU’s stance, some of which are more compatible with a commitment to strengthening democracy than others. First, it seems likely that as in the past, EU representatives are conducting their messaging in private, relying on other donors with a greater appetite for political risk to make public statements.

Second, some donors appear to believe that Hichilema deserves more time to deliver on his promises, especially given how much of his term in office he has had to devote to debt negotiations.

Third, some partners may be reluctant to criticise Hichilema because of a perception that he is an ally of the west during a period in which there is increasing concern about the growth of Russian and Chinese influence in Africa.

Fourth, donors may not have been fully aware of all the risks that come with transfers of power, which can generate challenges as well as opportunities. These risks can include, on the one hand, the weakening of civil society because of the appointment of prominent civil society figures to government posts and, on the other, a return to older political logics of patronage politics and censorship once popular support for the new government declines.

Understood in this way, the Zambian experience suggests a range of important lessons for the EU and other international donors that are both positive and cautionary.

 

Author

 

This article is part of the Deep Dive “European Responses to Moments of Democratic Opportunity”.

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

Photo credit: ©Sikwe Scarter, Unsplash